Preference votes without preference? Institutional effects on preference voting: an experiment

Abstract

A classical question of political science is to what extent electoral systems influence voting behaviour. Yet, many of these studies examine how different electoral systems affect the election results in terms of vote distribution across parties. Instead, we investigate how electoral rules affect intra party preference voting. Given the importance of the debate on the personalization of politics, insight into how electoral rules shape intra-party choice is a valuable contribution to the literature. In our study, we focus on the effect of two specific rules: the option to cast a list vote and on a single versus multiple preference votes. The results of experiments conducted in Belgium and the Netherlands show that electoral rules indeed influence voting behaviour with regard to intra party preference voting, although differences exist between the Netherlands and Belgium. Moreover, we find that the option to cast a list vote equally affects votes for the first candidate on the list, as well as lower positioned candidates. This suggests that preference votes might be less preferential than has often been assumed.

Voting and satisfaction with democracy in flexible-list PR

“…They suggest that the reason why voters vote for the head candidate is because she appears at the top of the list. Therefore, they do not have a genuine preference for this candidate(Nagtzaam, and van Erkel 2017). This literature usually comes from the Netherlands where elections are held under a flexible-list PR system, but where voters must vote for individual candidates (they cannot vote for the party-list).…”

Preference Voting in the Low Countries

“…In the Netherlands, voters' options regarding preference votes are more constrained. Unlike Belgium, voters in the Netherlands do not have the option to cast a list vote, but are always forced to cast a vote for one single candidate on a party list (Nagtzaam & Van Erkel, 2017). Moreover, one cannot vote for multiple candidates.…”

What explains preferential voting? A field experiment in Portugal

“…We argue that ballot structure is a relevant factor here. Whether voting for a candidate is optional or compulsory (in the sense that there is no formal way to simply express support for a party) is believed to be the most important difference between flexible list systems (Renwick and Pilet, 2016;Nagtzaam and van Erkel, 2017). Shugart (2005) even considers that flexible list systems in which the expression of preferences is made mandatory constitute a distinct sub-type, which he names latent list system.…”

“…In fact, their direct and longitudinal comparison of the aggregate percentage of preferential votes between countries is inconclusive: whereas Belgians tend to vote more preferentially than the Dutch, the Czechs and Swedes do so to a lesser extent (André et al, 2012;Renwick and Pilet, 2016). Nevertheless, an experiment carried out in the Netherlands and Belgium by Nagtzaam and van Erkel (2017), which analyzed the impact of different arrangements (not only compulsory vs. optional voting rules in flexible lists, but also the number of preferences voters are allowed to express) concluded that if expressing preferences is optional, fewer preferential votes will be cast.…”

“…Concerning the direct effect of voting rules, we argue that the lack of formal alternatives to the preferential vote will lead to more voters casting preferential votes in compulsory systems than in optional ones. In order to compare non-preferential voting in compulsory and optional systems, we rely on the shared assumption that in compulsory systems voting for the list-puller (the first candidate on the list) as well as blank or invalid voting is non-preferential voting (Andeweg and van Holsteyn, 2011;Hoedemakers, 2014;Renwick and Pilet, 2016; but see also Nagtzaam and van Erkel, 2017 for an appraisal of this assumption). Therefore, we posit that:…”