Preface

Hopt, Klaus J.; Hippel, Thomas von

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511712128.001

Cited by 3 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…Because associations are by law allowed to statutorily cede the control of appointment to another body than the general assembly—for example, the board (Hopt, 2010)—the strong control of appointment observed in the sample is hardly tautological. The prevalence of members in board composition may be characteristic of small membership organisations (compared, for instance, with political parties, labour unions, or international associations), where there is close identification with mutual, attainable benefits, and management is separated and professionalised (Thomsen, 2014; Van Puyvelde et al, 2016).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…External directors guarantee that sensitive tasks such as audits, compensation, and nomination can be handled autonomously. However, this trend has been questioned, as it emphasises expertise for the task, rather than knowledge of the line of business, and thus it may ultimately run against board duties to steer the business (Brody, 2010; Cornforth, 2003).…”

Section: Exclusive and Inclusive Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…External directors may be hard to attract towards non-profit boards, since they work without remuneration and scantily perceive low-powered incentives. Therefore, the implementation of burdensome requisites to qualify external directors may leave boardrooms empty (Brody, 2010). While it is accepted that the absence of executive duties in the organisation is a fundamental requisite for external directors, the skills and representative qualities required remain undefined.…”

Section: Exclusive and Inclusive Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although CEO directors would be unconventional because stakeholders internal to the organisation increase the risk of collusion and expropriation (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Hopt, 2010), they can align with patron interests and provide insight into the operation of the think tank (Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001). Which of these paths CEOs take throughout the lifespan of a think tank is an unpredictable matter, but since the costs of misconduct are non-negligible, CEOs may often sit on the inclusive side of Table 1.…”

Section: Exclusive and Inclusive Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…For instance, in France, the employees of non-profits can be directors but cannot hold the posts of president, vice-president, secretary-general, or treasurer (Deckert, 2010). Either offering insight into the operation of the organisation or counterbalancing patron control, employee directors on boards would be a sign of inclusive governance worth accounting for, since it would be rather exceptional among non-profits (Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Hansmann, 2013; Hopt, 2010).…”

Section: Exclusive and Inclusive Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

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The control of the policy advice industry: how patrons defer their decision-rights to think tank boards

Perez

Agafonow

2022

International Review of Administrative Sciences

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Patrons of think tanks—for example, governments, corporations, philanthropists, NGOs, and so forth—may control think tanks’ boards, that is, their highest decision-making body. Whether patrons are likely to control boards is a question that remains under-explored and under-theorised in public administration and governance scholarship. It is posited that patrons are likely to control boards when the marginal benefit of partaking in decision-making does not exceed the cost of information transfer. The comparative examination of International Relations think tanks’ statutes shows that patron control is substantial. However, patronage does not always guarantee board control. Patron control is moderated by the nature of the transaction. The conclusion assesses patron control concerning decision-making processes in the think tank and the idiosyncratic character of policy advice. Points for practitioners Practitioners can assess events of goal displacement in think tanks by learning about mechanisms that facilitate or hinder patron control over think tanks. Laying out the conditions under which patrons exercise control, the latter turns out to be substantial despite not all patrons having control over think tank boards. Patron control is shown to depend on the position of stakeholders in the decision-making chain and the nonlinear relation between effort and influence in policy advice.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Exclusive and Inclusive Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Exclusive and Inclusive Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Exclusive and Inclusive Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Exclusive and Inclusive Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

The control of the policy advice industry: how patrons defer their decision-rights to think tank boards

Perez

Agafonow

2022

International Review of Administrative Sciences

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Will your insurance type influence clinical quality outcomes? An investigation of contributing factors, underlying mechanism, and consequences

Sharma

Goradia

2023

Production and Operations Management

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Although past studies have found differences in clinical quality outcomes based on patients' insurance type, the extent of these discrepancies, the underlying mechanisms supporting this relationship, and factors that can moderate this effect have not yet been addressed. We seek to fill this gap by studying the relationship between insurance type and clinical quality outcomes using the level of care received, that is, treatment intensity, as a mediator. Using agency theory, we argue that underinsured patients (patients insured by Medicaid) will experience more adverse clinical quality outcomes due to lower treatment intensity compared to privately insured patients. We then explore whether two contextual factors-patient complexity and resource utilizationinfluence the relationship between insurance type and treatment intensity, and in turn clinical quality outcomes. We use 2010-2016 data from California to test these relationships. The insurance types used for comparison are private and Medi-Cal (California's equivalent of Medicaid, representing underinsured patients). A patient's 30-day readmission rate is used as a measure of clinical quality and the log of charges normalized by wage index and inflation (called treatment intensity) is used as a proxy for the level of care they received. We use within-hospital coarsened exact score matching to create a comparable group of patients using private and Medi-Cal insurance followed by a hospital fixed effects regression with errors clustered by hospital to test these relationships. Results indicate that treatment intensity mediates the relationship between insurance type and clinical quality outcomes. Further, the difference in treatment intensity based on insurance type is reduced as patient complexity increases, while higher utilization at a hospital lowers its incentive to provide equitable care to underinsured patients.

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Values, Performance, or Both? How Values-Focused Work Can Benefit From Results-Based Management

Speckbacher

2023

Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly

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While results-based performance measurement has become a common practice in governing relationships with external stakeholders, many nonprofits are struggling with severe tensions when implementing results-based management practices inside the organization. This article draws on performance management research in accounting and management to analyze why results-based management poses particular challenges for nonprofits. As its first contribution, the article conceptualizes dedication to values as a particular characteristic of nonprofit organizations that involves high role ambiguity among nonprofit staff. Second, it specifies a particular tension associated with results-based management practices in values-focused work: Results-based management helps to reduce role ambiguity, but by doing so it creates role conflict. Third, the article proposes the interactive use of results-based information as an approach to how organizations with a high dedication to values can increase role clarity for nonprofit staff, while avoiding role conflict.

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Preface

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

The control of the policy advice industry: how patrons defer their decision-rights to think tank boards

The control of the policy advice industry: how patrons defer their decision-rights to think tank boards

Will your insurance type influence clinical quality outcomes? An investigation of contributing factors, underlying mechanism, and consequences

Values, Performance, or Both? How Values-Focused Work Can Benefit From Results-Based Management

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