Predicting the duration of the Syrian insurgency

Abstract

While there were several relatively short uprisings in Northern Africa and the Middle East during the Arab Spring, the dispute between the rebels and government forces in Syria has evolved into a full-scale civil war. We try to predict the length of the Syrian insurgency with a three-stage technique. Using out-of-sample techniques, we first assess the predictive capacity of 69 explanatory variables for insurgency duration. After determining the model with the highest predictive power, we categorize Syria according to the variables in this final model. Based on in-sample approaches, we then predict the duration of the Syrian uprising for three different scenarios. The most realistic point prediction is 5.12 years from the insurgency's start, which suggests an end date between the end of 2016 and early 2017.

Could rebel child soldiers prolong civil wars?

“…Within this framework, most studies have focused on four clusters, each of them generating different predictions about which factor is likely to make conflicts shorter or longer: (1) physical terrain and geography; (2) cultural and ethnic influences; (3) rebel power; and (4) state power (e.g. Collier et al, 2004; Fearon, 2004; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006; Lyall, 2010; Pilster and Böhmelt, 2014).…”

“…Knowing which variables increase or decrease the duration of a conflict may help policymakers and scholars alike to gain a better assessment of the possible risks and costs involved. Moreover, insights on the duration of armed conflicts could facilitate the anticipation of the likelihood of military interventions or whether neighbouring countries will be destabilized (see Pilster and Böhmelt, 2014). Finally, by showing that this relationship is statistically and substantively significant, we also inform the existing literature on the determinants of child soldiering (e.g.…”

“…Knowing which variables increase or decrease the duration of a conflict may help policymakers and scholars alike to gain a better assessment of the possible risks and costs involved. Moreover, insights on the duration of armed conflicts could help scholars and policymakers alike to anticipate the likelihood of military interventions or whether neighboring countries will be destabilized (Pilster and Böhmelt, 2014). The current conflict case of Syria illustrates this well (Pilster and Böhmelt, 2014 Existing studies on child soldiers (e.g., Tynes and Early 2015;Lasley and Thyne, 2014;Blattman and Annan, 2008;Brett and Specht, 2004;Singer, 2006;Honwana, 2006) can be divided into three broad literature strands.…”

“…Moreover, insights on the duration of armed conflicts could help scholars and policymakers alike to anticipate the likelihood of military interventions or whether neighboring countries will be destabilized (Pilster and Böhmelt, 2014). The current conflict case of Syria illustrates this well (Pilster and Böhmelt, 2014 Existing studies on child soldiers (e.g., Tynes and Early 2015;Lasley and Thyne, 2014;Blattman and Annan, 2008;Brett and Specht, 2004;Singer, 2006;Honwana, 2006) can be divided into three broad literature strands. First, some scholars focus primarily on the determinants of child soldiering, i.e., those factors that increase or decrease of children joining armed groups during conflict in the first place.…”

“…Hence, conflict termination and, in turn, conflict duration depends on how fast the actors are able and willing to reveal information (Starr, 1978;Most and Starr, 1989). Within this willingness and opportunity framework, most studies have focused on four clusters, each of them generating different predictions about which factor is likely to make conflicts shorter or longer: (1) physical terrain and geography, (2) cultural and ethnic influences, (3) rebel power, and (4) state power (e.g., Collier et al, 2004;Fearon, 2004;Lyall, 2010;Hegre and Sambanis, 2006;Pilster and Böhmelt, 2014).…”