Three studies investigated the role of surface attributes in infants' identification of agents, using a habituation paradigm designed to tap infants' interpretation of grasping as goal directed (Woodward, 1998). When they viewed a bare human hand grasping objects, 7-and 12-month-old infants focused on the relation between the hand and its goal. When the surface properties of the hand were obscured by a glove, however, neither 7-nor 12-month-old infants represented its actions as goal directed (Study 1). Next, infants were shown that the gloved hands were part of a person either prior to (Study 2) or during (Study 3) the habituation procedure. Infants who actively monitored the gloved person in Study 2 and older infants in Study 3 interpreted the gloved reaches as goal directed. Thus, varying the extent to which an entity is identifiable as a person impacts infants' interpretation of the entity as an agent.The distinction between animate agents and inanimate objects is fundamental to both everyday and abstract acts of human cognition. Observing a child chasing a soccer ball, we are not surprised when the child swerves to avoid a tree, but we would be if the ball behaved like the child. We identify the child as an animate agent, and therefore interpret her behavior as expressing her underlying goals or intentions. We understand that this interpretation is not appropriately extended to inanimate objects such as balls. Our ability to quickly categorize entities as agents or inanimate objects is supported by rich perceptual regularities. Animate agents differ from inanimate objects in their typical shapes, rigidity, surface properties, sounds, and patterns of motion. These perceptual attributes correlate with the behavioral and psychological attributes that are central to folk conceptions of agents INFANCY, 6(3),