Précis ofFrustration Theory: An Analysis of Dispositional Learning and Memory

Abstract

This is a precis of a book on frustration theory, whose explanatory domain includes a family of phenom~na that have been summarized by the terms dispositional learning and memory-systems that ordmarily have a long-term historical etiology, and in which the learning is relatively reflexive and the memo~implicit and not strongly episodic. The book is an attempt, in the context of stimulusre~ponse l~a~mng theOI'~' to present in some detail an animal-based model of frustration as it is appIled to a Ilmlted-but stIll large-number of these experimentally established phenomena (perhaps the largest number organized by anyone such theory). These bear some resemblance to equivalent phen~mena in humans, to which the descriptive terms arousal, suppression, persistence, and regre~sIOn have been applied. An explicit caveat is that this is a book on one particular theory of frustratIOn and not a book on frustration theories. Whereas it does address other theories of frustration its main purpose is to review a line of theorizing and experimental research that has evolved ove; some 40 years: an analysis of the status of the concept of frustration in learning theory.In the history of the scientific study of learning and memory, a number of terms have been used to describe abstract experimental paradigms that purport to represent different mechanisms of learning. In the book discussed here, I refer to several of these, the most fundamental being classical (Pavlovian) conditioning and instrumental (Thorndikian) learning. These two are central to understanding the phenomena I will call the rewardschedule effects. These phenomena depend on a variety of interactions between reward and nonreward, and they are the basis for a family of generalizations known as frustration theory.My major thesis, in general terms, is that there is inherent in such reward schedules the buildup of primary frustration, defined simply as a temporary state that results when a response is nonreinforced (or nonrewarded, in more neutral language, in the appetitive case) in the presence of a reward expectancy; that a learned or anticipatory form of this temporally labile state, based on classical conditioning, can be elicited by an originally indifferent or neutral cue; that this conditional form of frustration, like other learned states, is permanent, at least for a given situation; and that, together, the primary (unlearned) and the secondary (learned) forms can account for a number of important processes in the dynamics of instrumental behavior, summarized by four familiar behavioral concepts: arousal, suppression, persistence, and regression. These four concepts define I am greatly indebted to Elizabeth Capaldi and Michael Rashotte for their valuable suggestions for revision of an earlier draft of this precis.

The relation between memory and expectancy as revealed by percentage and sequence of reward investigations

“…One view, apparently, is that on any given trial the animal remembers only the prior reward event (e.g., Amsel, 1994;Hull, 1952;Sheffield, 1949). Too, it appears to be assumed, implicitly if not explicitly, that animals anticipate only the reward event contingent upon the current response (e.g., Amsel, 1992;Chatlosh & Wasserman, 1992;Linwick et aI., 1988).…”

“…As indicated, Amsel's (1994) theory, which is primarily an intratrial theory, explicitly leaves room for an intertrial mechanism, a short-term or long-term stimulus trace or memory contributed by the previous trial (see also Amsel, 1967). Too, as indicated above, I (1994; see also Capaldi et aI., in press) have recently incorporated into his intertrial theory an intratrial mechanism similar to Amsel's.…”

“…As Amsel (1994) puts it, these other stimuli arise as a direct consequence of what happened on the last learning trial, the direct feed forward from trial N to trial N+ 1, which can be characterized as a short-or immediateterm trace or memory ofthe last goal experience that controls the next. This has been the interoceptive stimulus mechanism featured in many of Capaldi's (e.g., 1967) explanations of reward schedule learning, and in his view these stimuli can account for relatively long-term consequences of reinforcement and nonreinforcement.…”

Amsel’s analysis of reward-schedule effects

“…The ontogenetic results point to the need for a more analytical approach in the phyletic work, which has thus far been directed primarily to the question of whether there has been any evolutionary divergence in learning at all. Amsel's ontogenetic strategy (outlined in Table 3 of Amsel's [1994] precis) recommends itself also as a phyletic strategy and one whose usefulness extends beyond the study of reward-schedule effects to the study of behavior in general.…”

Persistence and the importance of nonreward: Some applications of frustration theory and DMOD

“…Older rats, however, show persistence if they have Copyright 1994 Psychonomic Society, Inc. been given experience with intermittent receipt of rewards (i.e., partial reinforcement): During extinction training they persist much longer than subjects that have always been rewarded. According to Amsel, the receipt of a reward when nonreward is expected results in counterconditioning~when the approach response becomes conditioned to the stimuli of frustrative nonreward (Amsel, 1994, Figure 2). …”