Pre-war experimental evidence that Putin’s propaganda elicited strong support for military invasion among Russians

Abstract

In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. The Putin regime used extensive and aggressive propaganda to win public support for the war. But can this propaganda really convince ordinary people? Using the unique timing of a survey experiment fielded a year before the invasion, we provide the first experimental evidence of the effectiveness of this propaganda among Russian citizens. Vignette treatments containing information on threats similar to stories running in Russian media around the time of the invasion in combination with statements from President Putin show that propaganda was highly effective. Even mild treatments were enough to increase support for military aggression against neighboring countries among Russians from around 8 to 48% and up to 59% among Putin’s supporters. Thus, the Russian president had good reason to believe that he could control popular opinion when he decided to launch a war against Ukraine.

Why Misinformation Must Not Be Ignored

“…Moreover, misinformation is not a single, homogenous phenomenon (Tay et al, 2024); even if much (most) misinformation is inconsequential, there can still be specific instances of misinformation-as per the examples provided in the preceding paragraph-that are highly consequential (also see Allen et al, 2023). This is especially true when taking into account repeated, systematic exposure-such as the tobacco industry's decades-long disinformation campaign (Brandt, 2007;Michaels, 2008;Oreskes & Conway, 2010;Proctor, 2012;Smith et al, 2011) and Russia's anti-Ukraine propaganda (Krishnarajan & Tolstrup, 2023;Roozenbeek, 2024; also see Geissler et al, 2023)-and all potential impacts beyond direct influences on relevant beliefs (e.g., influences on public debate, institutional trust, polarization, etc. ; Lauer, 2021;Lewandowsky et al, 2019;Lorenz-Spreen et al, 2023;Mauk & Grömping, 2023;Ognyanova et al, 2020;Tay et al, 2023).…”