Pre-Modern State-Building in Post-Soviet Russia

The State as Investment Market: A Framework for Interpreting the Post‐Soviet State in Eurasia

“…My perspective differs from both of these views on corruption by arguing that the separation between politics and the economy generally assumed to exist in several post‐Soviet states is an artificial one (Cappelli ; Ganev ; Sharafutdinova ). The process I identify as the “marketization” of the state is to some extent an inverse state capture, carried out from within the state itself, rather than initiated by private firms or any other outside force.…”

“…The scholarly response was to understand and explain these disappointing processes (Collins ; Fish ; McFaul ). At the same time, it became clear that the focus on regime transition and democracy was not enough, and attention was increasingly directed toward state formation and state viability in the post‐Soviet world, particularly, but not exclusively, with regard to Russia (Cappelli ; Easter , ; Ganev , ; Grzymala‐Busse and Jones Luong ; Lynch ; Shlapentokh ; Tsygankov ; Volkov ; Way ). Accordingly, similar to what has taken place in scholarship on Africa and the Arab world, a burgeoning debate has emerged regarding the nature of post‐Soviet stateness.…”

“…Other focus on how state building in the post‐Soviet region incorporate old and new institutional structures to produce a more modernized neo‐patrimonial, or patronal, form of rule: a mixed system, in which elements of patrimonial and rational‐bureaucratic rule coexist and are often interwoven (Easter , ; Hale ; Ilkhamov ; Schatz ). Still others advocate that the decentralized variant of patrimonialism characterizing the feudal state model, with its combination of “privatization” of public power, weak central state power, and strong regional potentates, offers the best parallel for understanding post‐Soviet Russia (Cappelli ; Shlapentokh , ). While none of these accounts neglects the importance of formal positions of political power, they all emphasize the prevalence of informal and personalistic networks, institutions, and exchange over formal, impersonal rules.…”

Общественные Советы При Органах Исполнительной Власти: Эксперты, Контролеры Или Мирские Челобитчики?

“…Объем статьи не позволяет углубиться в дискуссию о том, как соотносятся практики государства модерна и отечественная традиция «служивого народа». Мы не согласны с Э. Киннаном, О. Капелли и А. Гетти [Capelli, 2008;Keenan, 1986;Гетти, 2016], утверждающими, что российская политическая и административная культура наделена неизменными и не способными к изменению глубинными особенностями, поэтому система государственного управления в России носит принципиально домодерный характер. По этой же причине мы не склонны полностью поддерживать модель «сословного государства» С. Г. Кордонского [Кордонский, 2008] и модель этакратии О. И. Шкаратана [Шкаратан, 2015], которые также исходят из тезиса об уникальности отечественной государственности.…”

To Oligarchy Through Democracy or to Disorder Through Order

“…Political powerseeking to implement, strengthen and sustain an antidemocratic system, even to export it to neighboring countries-can assume the role of a supporter of democracy and its values in the initial period and can achieve alienation of democracy through "democratization". 9 In the beginning, political players hold the principles of "the will of the people" and "legitimacy of government" as priorities in 7 Putin's support of public opinion (See at: Hale, McFaul and Colton, 2004). 8 For example, in the 2018 Russian presidential race, on the one hand, the anti-democratic ideological direction and political culture of the majority of candidates, including Putin; on the other hand, their interest in election campaigns based on the Western model's liberal democratic values.…”