Pre-emptive patenting: securing market exclusion and freedom of operation

Abstract

JT03275947 STI Working Paper SeriesThe Working Paper series of the OECD Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry is designed to make available to a wider readership selected studies prepared by staff in the Directorate or by outside consultants working on OECD projects. The papers included in the series cover a broad range of issues, of both a technical and policy-analytical nature, in the areas of work of the DSTI. The Working Papers are generally available only in their original language -English or French -with a summary in the other.Comments on the papers are invited, and should be sent to the Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, OECD, 2 rue André-Pascal, 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France.The opinions expressed in these papers are the sole responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the OECD or of the governments of its member countries. ABSTRACTWe investigate statistically the characteristics, functioning and incidence of pre-emptive patenting, defined as patent filings whose main effect is to hamper the grant of other patents. Patent applications can be used to prevent the grant of exclusive rights on markets and technologies to others in order to ensure freedom of operation to their holder or keep patent-less competitors out of the market. Combining data from examination outcomes and prior art at the European Patent Office (EPO), we develop a methodology to identify pre-emptive patent applications. We find evidence of pre-emption associated to patent applications cited as compromising patentability while being deemed non inventive. Furthermore, amongst them, those which are withdrawn by the applicant have the strongest pre-emptive power. The coincidence of low inventiveness and high pre-emptive impact supports the idea that some of these patents may be strategically designed by their applicants to block patenting by others. RESUMÉNous analysons statistiquement les caractéristiques, le fonctionnement et les effets des brevets préemptifs, définis comme des (demandes de) brevets dont l'effet principal est d'empêcher la délivrance d'autres brevets. Les demandes de brevets peuvent être utilisées pour empêcher la délivrance de droits exclusifs à d'autres parties sur des marchés et des technologies en vue d'assurer la liberté de manoeuvre à leur titulaire ou de maintenir des compétiteurs sans brevets à l'écart du marché. Combinant des données du résultat de l'examen et de l'art antérieur de l'Office Européen des Brevets (OEB), nous développons une méthodologie qui identifie les demandes préemptives de brevets. Nous trouvons des évidences de préemption pour des demandes de brevets citées comme compromettant la brevetabilité d'autres demandes alors qu'elles ne sont pas elles-mêmes jugés inventifs. De plus parmi elles, celles qui sont abandonnées par le demandeur lui-même ont le pouvoir préemptif le plus fort. La coïncidence de faible inventivité et de pouvoir préemptif fort suggère que certaines de ces demandes de brevets sont stratégiquement conçues par leur titulair...

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