Praktische Syllogismen bei Aristoteles

Corcilius, Klaus

doi:10.1515/agph.2008.011

Cited by 51 publications

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“…Price (2011: 240 n. 60, 246-50). 27 Corcilius (2008a) argues with an untiring integrity that the practical syllogism is no more than an analogy for the efficient causation of movement by a combination of desire and cognition. This holds good of the lower animals, who do not act upon practical inferences.…”

Section: Starting-point: To φ (An Act)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, Nussbaum (1978: 358) takes the reference to be to the major premise (comparing 'Every man should take walks', 7 701a13), explaining this as follows: 'The minor premise does not detain the agent, and the bodily pars interact rapidly; so there is virtually no gap between the thought of the major premise and the motion.' 39 See Corcilius (2008aCorcilius ( : 268, 2008b, who cites Bonitz 296a12-17. 40 I say little here about the important passage AE C.3 1147a24-31; for more, see Price (2011: 291, 295-6 n. 35).…”

Section: Starting-point: To φ (An Act)mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Choice and Action in Aristotle

Price

2016

Phronesis

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There is a current debate about the grammar of intention: do I intend to φ (whose content is an act), or that I φ (whose content is quasi-propositional)? The equivalent question in Aristotle relates especially to choice (prohairesis). I argue that, in the context of practical reasoning, choice, as also wish (boulēsis), has as its object an act. I then explore the role that this plays within his account of the relation of thought to action. In particular, I discuss the relation of deliberation to the practical syllogism, and the thesis that the conclusion of the second is an action.

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Section: Starting-point: To φ (An Act)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Starting-point: To φ (An Act)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Choice and Action in Aristotle

Price

2016

Phronesis

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“…It is, to my mind, an open question whether the practical syllogism represents deductive inference. See especially Corcilius .…”

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confidence: 99%

Aristotle's Cognitive Science: Belief, Affect and Rationality

McCready-Flora

2013

Philos Phenomenol Research

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I offer a novel interpretation of Aristotle's psychology and notion of rationality, which draws the line between animal and specifically human cognition. Aristotle distinguishes belief (doxa), a form of rational cognition, from imagining (phantasia), which is shared with non‐rational animals. We are, he says, “immediately affected” by beliefs, but respond to imagining “as if we were looking at a picture.” Aristotle's argument has been misunderstood; my interpretation explains and motivates it. Rationality includes a filter that interrupts the pathways between cognition and behavior. This prevents the subject from responding to certain representations. Stress and damage compromise the filter, making the subject respond indiscriminately, as non‐rational animals do. Beliefs are representations that have made it past the filter, which is why they can “affect [us] immediately.” Aristotle's claims express ceteris paribus generalizations, subject to exceptions. No list of provisos could turn them into non‐vacuous universal claims, but this does not rob them of their explanatory power. Aristotle's cognitive science resolves a tension we grapple with today: it accounts for the specialness of human action and thinking within a strictly naturalistic framework. The theory is striking in its insight and explanatory power, instructive in its methodological shortcomings.

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Aristotle’s Language for Success in (Practical) Explanations

Angioni

2023

Law and Philosophy Library

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Praktische Syllogismen bei Aristoteles

Cited by 51 publications

References 0 publications

Choice and Action in Aristotle

Choice and Action in Aristotle

Aristotle's Cognitive Science: Belief, Affect and Rationality

Aristotle’s Language for Success in (Practical) Explanations

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