Pragmatism and Practicality: Rethinking U.S. Civil–Military Relations Models for a Turbulent Era

Abstract

In his recent article Saving Samuel Huntington and the Need for Pragmatic Civil–Military Relations, Travis proposes a model of civil–military relations based on “pragmatic civilian control.” This model has three main shortcomings. First, it does not adequately answer the question of “professional supremacy” versus “civilian supremacy” in making crucial decisions during wartime. Second, the distinctions between “wars of choice” and “wars of necessity,” and about the “kind of war” being fought, key theoretical variables mentioned by the author, are hard to judge objectively. And third, the new model would likely exacerbate rather than diminish the problem of military leaders getting involved in political and even partisan controversies; this is particularly problematic, given the unusual situation of many military leaders in the Trump administration occupying civilian positions of authority. If it is to be of practical use to policy makers, future scholarship on pragmatism and civil–military relations must address these weaknesses.

Pursuing Civilian Control Over the Military

“…Popescu argues that attempting to classify wars by distinguishing between “wars of choice” versus “wars of necessity” is unhelpful for policy makers and the military because making such distinctions is based on “subjective” judgments (Popescu, 2018, p.5). Maybe the only “objective” method to determine the kind of war being pursued is a formal declaration or war by the Congress; or the President can specify the type of war by executive order?…”

“…This essay is responding to Dr. Ionut Popescu’s disputatio sine fine for the article “Saving Samuel Huntington and the Need for Pragmatic Civil-Military Relations.” He challenges the pragmatist outlook by questioning its usefulness to “manage relations between the military and its civilian superiors in a democracy such as the United States,” because it fails to deliver answers to three interrelated concerns: (1) debates between “civilian supremacists” and “military supremacists” to resolve “the proper division of labor for strategic supreme command decisions during war”; (2) determining the kind of war being fought, such as distinguishing between “wars of choice” versus “wars of necessity”; and (3) dealing with anxieties about “increasing the politicization of the military by moving away from the Huntingtonian paradigm of the soldier staying outside the political sphere” (Popescu, 2018, p. 6). Huntington’s (1956a, 1956b) “objective civilian control” theory of civil–military relations decrees that the military must eschew politics and partisanship to reinforce civilian control over the military and maximize the nation’s security.…”

Kontrol Sipil Pragmatis: Implementasi Hubungan Sipil-Militer di Masa Pemerintahan Joko Widodo

“…Pola semacam ini lazim terjadi di negara-negara otoriter/praetorian. Misalnya selama era Orde Baru di Indonesia dan selama masa pemerintahan Donald Trump di Amerika Serikat (Popescu, 2019). Di Indonesia, tren politisasi organisasi militer makin terlihat sejak pandemi Covid-19, dimana TNI terlibat langsung dalam penanggulangan dampak pandemi di masyarakat.…”

Janowitz and Huntington—Better Together: A Response

“…Civil-military experts, the vast majority who instinctively oppose Huntington against Janowitz, pay scant attention to key planks on which they agree, including the contribution of an analytically distinct military mind, or military point of view, with capacity to enhance civilian approaches to national security challenges (Brooks, 2020;Cohen, 1997;Feaver, 1996;Popescu, 2019;Schiff 1995;Travis, 2017Travis, , 2019. The ideal of a military science that supplies critical information to political authority while remaining subordinate in the state's discussion and formulation of foreign and defense policy is common to both schools.…”