Meaning and Relevance 2012
DOI: 10.1017/cbo9781139028370.016
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Pragmatics, modularity and mindreading

Abstract: The central problem for pragmatics is that sentence meaning vastly underdetermines speaker's meaning. The goal of pragmatics is to explain how the gap between sentence meaning and speaker's meaning is bridged. This paper defends the broadly Gricean view that pragmatic interpretation is ultimately an exercise in mind-reading, involving the inferential attribution of intentions. We argue, however, that the interpretation process does not simply consist in applying general mind-reading abilities to a particular (… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

2
42
0
4

Year Published

2012
2012
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
6
1

Relationship

0
7

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 69 publications
(48 citation statements)
references
References 9 publications
2
42
0
4
Order By: Relevance
“…In the meantime, however, it should be emphasised that Scott-Phillips's claim about the nonostensive nature of chimpanzee communication is driven not by known behavioural differences between apes and humans but by contested theoretical assumptions about what Gricean communication requires, and correlated intuitions about what animal communicators are likely or unlikely to be able to do. For example, it is often argued that Gricean communication involves reasoning about others' mental states, and in particular the production and comprehension of high orders of mental state representation-and that these abilities are uniquely human (Sperber 2000;Sperber and Wilson 2002;Tomasello 2008;Corballis 2011;Scott-Phillips 2014, 2015a. Making explicit a claim already that is already implicit in the work of Tomasello, Corballis, and others, Scott-Phillips (2014) argues that human infants acquire language because they are capable of fourth-order representations of others' beliefs and intentions; and that apes do not, because they are incapable of such representations.…”
Section: Psychological Criteria For Ostensionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the meantime, however, it should be emphasised that Scott-Phillips's claim about the nonostensive nature of chimpanzee communication is driven not by known behavioural differences between apes and humans but by contested theoretical assumptions about what Gricean communication requires, and correlated intuitions about what animal communicators are likely or unlikely to be able to do. For example, it is often argued that Gricean communication involves reasoning about others' mental states, and in particular the production and comprehension of high orders of mental state representation-and that these abilities are uniquely human (Sperber 2000;Sperber and Wilson 2002;Tomasello 2008;Corballis 2011;Scott-Phillips 2014, 2015a. Making explicit a claim already that is already implicit in the work of Tomasello, Corballis, and others, Scott-Phillips (2014) argues that human infants acquire language because they are capable of fourth-order representations of others' beliefs and intentions; and that apes do not, because they are incapable of such representations.…”
Section: Psychological Criteria For Ostensionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The second, theory of mind (TOM), refers to the ability to infer the mental states of others-their feelings, beliefs, intents and motivations. This knowledge provides a basis for collaboration and sharing, but also facilitates comprehension of the intended meaning of another person's communication by resolving ambiguities and ambivalencies (Sperber and Wilson 2002). In an evolutionary context, the understanding of mutual internal states, thoughts and intentions (e.g., hungry, need meat, must hunt) combined with recognition of common goals (e.g., killing a woolly mammoth), prompted cooperative or joint efforts.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…) to the requestee if the request should be granted (Brown and Levinson 1987). Recent research and theory also suggest that PLC and Theory of Mind and Emotion Language are intricately interwoven, and require intact frontal lobe and executive function development, and thus there is considerable evidence that Theory of Mind and Emotion Language abilities should be probed by PLC assessment instruments as well (Abu-Akel 2003; Bishop and Norbury 2005;Carlson et al 2004;Frith and Frith 2003;Kuperberg et al 2000;Martin and McDonald 2003;Sperber and Wilson 2002;Stuss et al 2001). But how many and which Theory of Mind and Emotion Language processes or markers must be included in a PLC assessment instrument?…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Domains for the PLC coding system were drawn from the theoretical and research literatures on pragmatics (e.g., Bach and Harnish 1979;Britton and Pellegrini 1990;Brown and Levinson 1978;Grice 1967;Levinson 1983;Lyons 1977;Palmer 1986;Schenkein 1978;Searle 1969;Sperber and Wilson 2002). Thirteen PLC domains were identified and defined for coding purposes using this literature: Requests; Speech Acts (variety and appropriateness); Interlocutor Variety; Gricean Principles; Negotiations, Directions, and/or Instructions; Conversational Turn-taking; Topic Control and Maintenance; Nonliteral Language, Use of Indirection, and Presupposition; Rituals, Greetings, Goodbyes; Nonverbal Communication; Speech Characteristics (such as prosody) and Fluency; Theory of Mind and Emotion Language; Discourse Attentiveness and Empathy, and Narrative.…”
Section: Measures and Instrumentsmentioning
confidence: 99%