Pragmatic functions and lexical categories

Abstract

Much recent work has argued that the major lexical categories can be distinguished in terms of pragmatic functions (e.g., Baker 2003;Bhat 1994;Croft 2001;Hengeveld 1992). Typically, such pragmatic accounts argue that nouns distinguish themselves by referring, verbs distinguish themselves by predicating and adjectives distinguish themselves by modifying. The current article argues that such accounts are prone to two distinct sets of problems. The first set of problems arise from the definitions of the pragmatic functions that are employed in these accounts. Thus, the definitions of predication and modification that feature in such accounts are typically so similar they render attempts to distinguish verbs and adjectives in terms of them vacuous. Moreover, the definitions of all three pragmatic functions are often so vague and general that they apply with equal ease to words of all three major lexical categories. When more specific definitions are given, however, they typically exclude words from their intended category while continuing to include words from other categories. The second set of problems arise from the lack of direct evidence for the pragmatic functions. Such an absence of evidence gives rise to disputes over issues as basic as whether a given lexical category performs a given pragmatic function or not, whether there are two, three or more pragmatic functions and whether pragmatic functions are performed by words, phrases or di¤erent units altogether. It is argued that in the absence of direct evidence such basic disputes cannot be satisfactorily resolved. It is concluded that these problems are as serious as those which a¿ict semantic and morphosyntactic approaches to lexical categories and thus that the prospects for a coherent explanation of lexical categories remain as remote as ever.

The nature of parts of speech

“…It follows from the above discussion that the concepts of modification and modifier are paradigm examples of mixed concepts in the sense of section 1.1. A purely semantic definition of modification has proved difficult (Smith 2010) because it is hard to capture the difference between modification and predication without reference to formal structure. The intuition is, anyway, the following: Given concepts X and Y such that X either refers or predicates.…”

Re-discovering the Quechua adjective

“…But without consensus as to which kinds of evidence are the most relevant for determining word classes, setting the record straight for Quechua is not totally straighforward. In a recent exchange, Smith (2010) and Baker (2010) argued explicitly against using pragmatic evidence for distinguishing word classes, taking the strong position that only syntactic evidence is acceptable, while Croft (2010) countered by claiming that syntactic, semantic, and pragmatics should be jointly considered. Enfield (2006a) also points out some of the problems with considering only syntax at the expense of semantics.…”

The ‘nouniness’ of attributive adjectives and ‘verbiness’ of predicative adjectives: evidence from phonology

“… 4 Smith (2010: 731–5) has criticised this semantic analysis, suggesting that ‘contra Bhat [1994] and Croft … there is not a neat correspondence between pragmatic functions and the contrast between transitory and permanent properties’ (2010: 733). But neither Bhat nor Croft (nor Bolinger, for that matter) proposes a neat correspondence.…”

“…Croft, like Bolinger, merely refers to tendencies, while Bhat even says that ‘predicative adjectives are ambiguous in naming either a fairly permanent property … and in naming a temporary property’ (1994: 60). Smith, citing Ferris (1993), goes on to state that ‘prenominal adjectives with transitory readings are common in English’ and that ‘an internet search with the keywords responsible and pupil yields many examples … in which responsible has a transitory reading even though it occurs prenominally’ (2010: 733). In both cases Smith provides just two examples, with no further discussion of frequencies of transitory versus permanent meanings.…”