Pragmatic encroachment and justified group belief

Abstract

The theory of pragmatic encroachment states that the risks associated with being wrong, or the practical stakes, can make a difference to whether one’s evidence is good enough to justify belief. While still far from the orthodox view, it has garnered enough popularity that it is worth exploring the implications when we apply the theory of pragmatic encroachment to group epistemology, specifically to the justificatory status of the beliefs of group agents. When we do, I claim, we discover two novel cases of divergence; cases where a group epistemic agent is justified in believing but none of the members are, and vice versa. Using Jennifer Lackey’s influential Group Epistemic Agent Account as a foil, in particular Lackey’s arguments against previous proposed cases of divergence, the present paper defends the following argument, which I call Pragmatic Encroachment Divergence (PED): (i) Practical stakes make a difference to what an agent (group or individual) is justified in believing. (ii) The practical stakes of a group agent can come apart from the practical stakes of the (operative) members. (iii) Therefore, it is possible for the justified beliefs of a group to diverge from the justified beliefs of its members.

Social Group Moral Encroachment

“…Similarly, the moral stakes of my belief depend on the structural moral stakes of the relevant group's belief with the same content. This sketch might be undermined in this context at least by Nathan Biebel's (2023) recent argument that pragmatic stakes for a group and the individual can come apart. So, I leave the issue open for the purposes of this paper.…”

Permissive Divergence

“…For a related discussion on the relationship between pragmatic encroachment and epistemic permissivism, see Quanbeck and Worsnip (forthcoming). For a recent paper on pragamtic enchroachment and collective justification, see (Biebel, 2023). I want to thank an anonymous referee for comments on this issue.…”