Pragmatic approach to decision making under uncertainty: The case of the disjunction effect

Bagassi, Maria; Macchi, Laura

doi:10.1080/13546780500375663

Cited by 24 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…Relevance Theory, by giving good predictions of these behaviors, instead revealed that people are not incoherent in the way they reason as they use contextual information in addition to the information explicitly provided to them, which makes it difficult to reason without a concrete context. The literature is quite abundant in this area and includes the logic of connectors (see for examples Politzer, 1986; Sperber et al, 1995; Noveck, 2001), Piaget's inclusion task (see for example Masson et al, 2016b; Politzer, 2016), bias in probability judgment (see for examples Hilton, 1995; Baratgin and Noveck, 2000; Baratgin and Politzer, 2006, 2007, 2010), and decision making (see for examples Bless et al, 1998; Bagassi and Macchi, 2006; Masson et al, 2016, 2017a).…”

Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation in Online Conversations: The Response Times as a Window Into the Cognition of Language Processing

2019

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Measuring the cognitive cost of interpreting the meaning of sentences in a conversation is a complex task, but it is also at the core of Sperber and Wilson's Relevance Theory. In cognitive sciences, the delay between a stimulus and its response is often used as an approximation of the cognitive cost. We have noticed that such a tool had not yet been used to measure the cognitive cost of interpreting the meaning of sentences in a free-flowing and interactive conversation. The following experiment tests the ability to discriminate between sentences with a high cognitive cost and sentences with a low cognitive cost using the response time of the participants during an online conversation in a protocol inspired by the Turing Test. We have used violations of Grice's Cooperative Principle to create conditions in which sentences with a high cognitive cost would be produced. We hypothesized that response times are directly correlated to the cognitive cost required to generate implicatures from a statement. Our results are coherent with the literature in the field and shed some new light on the effect of violations on the humanness of a conversational agent. We show that violations of the maxim of Relation had a particularly important impact on response times and the perceived humanness of a conversation partner. Violations of the first maxim of Quantity and the fourth maxim of Manner had a lesser impact, and only on male participants.

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Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation in Online Conversations: The Response Times as a Window Into the Cognition of Language Processing

2019

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“…This disjunction effect again produces a negative interference effect. However, only one study tried to replicate this and this study concluded that the results were produced by an artifact in the specific way the questions were asked and thus questioned whether the results actually test the sure thing principle (Bagassi and Macchi, 2006).…”

Section: Disjunction Effect In Decision Makingmentioning

confidence: 99%

What is The Evidence for Quantum Like Interference Effects in Human Judgments and Decision Behavior?

Busemeyer¹,

Franco²

2010

Neuroquantology

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This article examines the empirical evidence for interference effects in psychological experiments. It also reviews the competing interpretation of these effects with respect to traditional cognitive models and new quantum cognition models. The conclusion is that quantum theory provides unifying principles for explaining interference effects found in a wide variety of different experimental paradigms, and it provides a viable new theoretical approach for understanding cognition and decision making.

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“…There are many examples in the psychological literature that answers given, considered to be incorrect by the experimenter, by adult participants are actually the result of the participants' misunderstanding of the intentions of the experimenter. The utterances used and the context of the experimental task trigger implicatures in the participants that can induce answers that are different from those expected by the experimenter (see Dulany and Hilton, 1991;Sperber et al, 1995;Baratgin and Noveck, 2000;Macchi, 2000;Politzer and Macchi, 2000;Baratgin, 2002Baratgin, , 2009Bagassi and Macchi, 2006;Baratgin and Politzer, 2006, 2007, 2010Macchi and Bagassi, 2012;Macchi et al, 2019Macchi et al, , 2020. Many developmental studies also give pieces of evidence for the ability of children, given their age, to recognize the intentions of the communicator (see Braine and Shanks, 1965a,b;McGarrigle and Donaldson, 1974;Rose and Blank, 1974;Markman and Wachtel, 1988;Politzer, 1993Politzer, , 2004Politzer, , 2016Gelman and Bloom, 2000;Diesendruck and Markson, 2001;Bagassi et al, 2020, for examples).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pragmatics in the False-Belief Task: Let the Robot Ask the Question!

et al. 2020

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The poor performances of typically developing children younger than 4 in the first-order false-belief task “Maxi and the chocolate” is analyzed from the perspective of conversational pragmatics. An ambiguous question asked by an adult experimenter (perceived as a teacher) can receive different interpretations based on a search for relevance, by which children according to their age attribute different intentions to the questioner, within the limits of their own meta-cognitive knowledge. The adult experimenter tells the child the following story of object-transfer: “Maxi puts his chocolate into the green cupboard before going out to play. In his absence, his mother moves the chocolate from the green cupboard to the blue one.” The child must then predict where Maxi will pick up the chocolate when he returns. To the child, the question from an adult (a knowledgeable person) may seem surprising and can be understood as a question of his own knowledge of the world, rather than on Maxi's mental representations. In our study, without any modification of the initial task, we disambiguate the context of the question by (1) replacing the adult experimenter with a humanoid robot presented as “ignorant” and “slow” but trying to learn and (2) placing the child in the role of a “mentor” (the knowledgeable person). Sixty-two typical children of 3 years-old completed the first-order false belief task “Maxi and the chocolate,” either with a human or with a robot. Results revealed a significantly higher success rate in the robot condition than in the human condition. Thus, young children seem to fail because of the pragmatic difficulty of the first-order task, which causes a difference of interpretation between the young child and the experimenter.

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Pragmatic approach to decision making under uncertainty: The case of the disjunction effect

Cited by 24 publications

References 2 publications

Cooperation in Online Conversations: The Response Times as a Window Into the Cognition of Language Processing

Cooperation in Online Conversations: The Response Times as a Window Into the Cognition of Language Processing

What is The Evidence for Quantum Like Interference Effects in Human Judgments and Decision Behavior?

Pragmatics in the False-Belief Task: Let the Robot Ask the Question!

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