Practice and payment: Determinants of candidate list position in European Parliament elections

Gherghina, Sergiu; Chiru, Mihail

doi:10.1177/1465116510380284

Cited by 38 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 18 publications

(9 reference statements)

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“…Gherghina and Chiru (2010) find that In the empirical part of this study I will strive to keep the value that MEPs place on reelection constant, while I explore the effect of uncertainty on parties' selection of candidates.…”

Section: The Model In a European Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Striving for influence

Hermansen

2016

Party Politics

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I consider how asymmetric information between the party selectorate and members of Parliament affects the renomination of incumbent candidates. By applying an adverse-selection model I argue that the selectorate looks to past performance to select candidates it expects will gain influence. However, the impact of performance varies according to the need for and availability of information. The European Parliament (EP) provides a most-likely case for information asymmetry. Studying three elections in 11 member states, I find that the allocation of influential positions in office improves chances of reselection. The effect increases when the allocation is more selective, and when the prior uncertainty around candidacies is high. The Moreover, the greater the variation in the candidates' ability, the greater the prior uncertainty around candidacies. This again, increases the effect of performance, as the selectorate needs more information. I test this implication by identifying categories of MEPs whose ability to influence is particularly uncertain.The following study is based on the allocation of safe seats to incumbent members in 11 member-states of the European Union across three elections. The analysis is based on original data on the list placement of 1134 incumbent MEPs, their political background, as well as their effort and performance in office. Results show that

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Section: The Model In a European Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Striving for influence

Hermansen

2016

Party Politics

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“…In other words, parties have little incentive to pay careful attention to the quality of candidates far down on their lists. This fact and the importance of the initial ordering of ballots by political parties in EP elections have been empirically supported by several other studies (Linek and Outlý 2006;Gherghina and Chiru 2010). Since we focus on analysis of the quality of candidates, these arguments also leads us to regard the fact that some parties do not place the full number of possible candidates on the list as unimportant for our analysis.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 80%

Candidate quality across different orders of elections: the cases of the Czech Republic and Slovakia

Kovář

2013

East European Politics

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Elections to the European Parliament fall within the category of second-order elections (SOEs). Because these types of elections do not lead to the formation of government, there is less at stake and, consequently, voters behave differently when casting votes. But do also political parties also behave as if there is less at stake as voters do? This article draws on an original dataset on the political experience of party candidates in the Czech Republic and Slovakia to explicitly link the SOE model to independent actions of political parties. The results show that political parties indeed nominate higher quality candidates to the first-order arena, where more is at stake. Moreover, parties in government in first-order arena react to domestic situation and nominate lower quality candidates to EP elections than parties in opposition. IntroductionThe fact that elections to the European Parliament (EP) are different from national parliamentary elections in European Union (EU) member states has been evident ever since the very first of these Europe-wide elections were held in 1979. In their immediate aftermath, Reif and Schmitt (1980) labelled first direct EP elections as "second-order national elections" (for an overview, see Marsh and Mikhaylov 2010). In a later work, Reif (1997) proposed an operational definition of such second-order elections (SOEs):

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“…In this sense, the domestic electoral systems may have an impact on how MEPs define their role once working in the EP. The link can also work in the other direction, depending on how MEPs are selected at the national level and, especially, on how campaigns are fought; European citizens will be differently informed of and interested in EP elections (Bowler & Farrell 1993Gherghina & Chiru 2010;Wüst 2009). …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutional and Policy Change in the European Parliament

Servent¹

2015

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Practice and payment: Determinants of candidate list position in European Parliament elections

Cited by 38 publications

References 18 publications

Striving for influence

Striving for influence

Candidate quality across different orders of elections: the cases of the Czech Republic and Slovakia

Institutional and Policy Change in the European Parliament

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