Practical success and the nature of truth

Abstract

Philip Kitcher has argued for a causal correspondence view of truth, as against a deflationary view, on the grounds that the former is better poised than the latter to explain systematically successful patterns of action. Though Kitcher is right to focus on systematically successful action, rather than singular practical successes, he is wrong to conclude that causal correspondence theories are capable of explaining systematic success. Rather, I argue, truth bears no explanatory relation to systematic practical success. Consequently, the causal correspondence view is not in a better position to explain success than the deflationary view; theories of truth are the wrong place to look for explanations of systematic practical success.

Deflating the Success-Truth Connection

“…6 This is related to the observation that the explanations of why each male member of a population is male and why each female member is female still fail to explain the population's ratio of males to females. See Wrenn [2011].…”

Truth: explanation, success, and coincidence

“…Wrenn ( 2011 : 468–469) is surely right when he points out that evolution will select against those creatures whose beliefs tend to lead to unsuccessful actions. Presumably, then, evolution might select for some X that produces success-conducive beliefs; and this might “explain” why X produces success-conducive beliefs.…”

“…16X might most plausibly be a psychological (especially a belief-forming) mechanism. Wrenn (2011: 468) seems to have something like this in mind.…”

“…2The distinction between psychological and effective pertinence is due to Kitcher (2002: 358–359) and the terminology is Wrenn’s (2011: 460). My own definitions elaborate substantially on their sources; there are subtle variations between the accounts, but they need not delay us here.…”

“…8We are granting the deflationist the view that such beliefs appear in the intentional explanations of rational actions; Wrenn (2011) contends that this “single action-guiding belief” view of intentional explanation is controversial.…”