Practical multi-candidate election system

Abstract. In this paper, we study the problem of simultaneously achieving several security properties, for voting schemes, without non-standard assumptions. More specifically, we focus on the universal verifiability of the computation of the tally, on the unconditional privacy/anonymity of the votes, and on the receipt-freeness properties, for the most classical election processes. Under usual assumptions and efficiency requirements, we show that a voting system that wants to publish the final list of the voters who actually voted, and to compute the number of times each candidate has been chosen, we cannot achieve:-universal verifiability of the tally (UV) and unconditional privacy of the votes (UP) simultaneously, unless all the registered voters actually vote;

show abstract

“…On the other hand, schemes using mix-nets [1, 9-12, 14, 19, 22] and/or homomorphic encryption [3,6,7] may provide it.…”

Section: Universal Verifiability Of the Tallymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In voting schemes based on homomorphic encryption [3,6,7] privacy relies on computational assumptions, and is thus not unconditional. When mix-nets are used, this is the same, since the latter applies on asymmetric encryptions of the votes.…”

Section: Unconditional Privacymentioning

confidence: 99%

On Some Incompatible Properties of Voting Schemes

Chevallier-Mames¹,

Fouque

Pointcheval

et al. 2010

Towards Trustworthy Elections

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…These homomorphic properties make this encryption scheme suitable for different applications such as secure voting and lottery protocols [3,14], DSA sharing protocols [18], and private information retrieval [19]. Threshold Paillier encryption scheme: The following is a procedure that shares the Paillier decryption function among n users with the Asmuth-Bloom SSS such that when t users come together they can decrypt the ciphertext.…”

Section: Sharing Of the Paillier Decryption Functionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We give three novel FSSs, one for the RSA [23], one for the ElGamal decryption [13] and the other for the Paillier decryption [21] functions. These public key cryptosystems have several interesting properties useful in various applications [1,3,14,18,19]. The proposed schemes are provably secure and to the best of our knowledge they are the first realization of function sharing based on the Asmuth-Bloom SSS.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Threshold Cryptography Based on Asmuth-Bloom Secret Sharing

Kaya

Selçuk

Tezcan

2006

Computer and Information Sciences – ISCIS 2006

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper, we investigate how threshold cryptography can be conducted with the Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing scheme and present three novel function sharing schemes for RSA, ElGamal and Paillier cryptosystems. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first provably secure threshold cryptosystems realized using the Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing. Proposed schemes are comparable in performance to earlier proposals in threshold cryptography.

show abstract

“…For example, in voting scheme, such as [15,1], the authority can check the universally checkable proofs of validity of ciphertext and compute the tally. However, the result will no longer be a ciphertext that withstands CCA.…”

Section: Ind-ccamentioning

confidence: 99%

Threshold Cryptosystems Secure against Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks

Fouque

Pointcheval

2001

Advances in Cryptology — ASIACRYPT 2001

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. Semantic security against chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) is widely believed as the correct security level for public-key encryption scheme. On the other hand, it is often dangerous to give to only one people the power of decryption. Therefore, threshold cryptosystems aimed at distributing the decryption ability. However, only two efficient such schemes have been proposed so far for achieving IND-CCA. Both are El Gamal-like schemes and thus are based on the same intractability assumption, namely the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. In this article we rehabilitate the twin-encryption paradigm proposed by Naor and Yung to present generic conversions from a large family of (threshold) IND-CPA scheme into a (threshold) IND-CCA one in the random oracle model. An efficient instantiation is also proposed, which is based on the Paillier cryptosystem. This new construction provides the first example of threshold cryptosystem secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks based on the factorization problem. Moreover, this construction provides a scheme where the "homomorphic properties" of the original scheme still hold. This is rather cumbersome because homomorphic cryptosystems are known to be malleable and therefore not to be CCA secure. However, we do not build a "homomorphic cryptosystem", but just keep the homomorphic properties.

show abstract

Practical multi-candidate election system

Cited by 220 publications

References 34 publications

On Some Incompatible Properties of Voting Schemes

On Some Incompatible Properties of Voting Schemes

Threshold Cryptography Based on Asmuth-Bloom Secret Sharing

Threshold Cryptosystems Secure against Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About