Practical Ideology in Militant Organizations

Abstract

Ideology shapes militant recruitment, organization, and conflict behavior. Existing research assumes doctrinal consistency, top-down socialization of adherents, and clear links between formal ideology and political action. But it has long been recognized that ideological commitments do not flow unaltered from overarching cleavages or elite narratives; they are uneven, contingent, fraught with tension, and often ambivalent. What work does ideology do in militant groups if it is not deeply studied, internalized, or sincerely believed? How can scholars explain collective commitment, affinity, and behavioral outcomes among militants who clearly associate themselves with a group, but who may not consistently (or ever) be true believers or committed ideologues? I argue that practical ideologies—sets of quotidian principles, ideas, and social heuristics that reflect relational worldviews rather than specific published political doctrines, positions, platforms, or plans—play a key role in militant socialization through everyday practices. Ethnographic evidence gained from fieldwork among Palestinians in Lebanon demonstrates how militants and affiliates render ideas about ideological closeness and distance accessible through emotional, intellectual, and moral appeals. This approach reaffirms the role of discourse and narrative in creating informal mechanisms of militant socialization without expressly invoking formal doctrine.

Foundations of the Vanguard: the origins of leftist rebel groups

“…One explanation for why rebels would adopt leftist ideologies relates to the possible benefits available to rebel groups for adopting a specific ideology. These benefits can take the form of material resources (Buhaug, 2006; Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood, 2014) or enhanced socialization (Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood, 2014; Hoover Green, 2018; Leader Maynard, 2019; Parkinson, 2021). Rebels might therefore adopt leftist ideologies because that ideology provides more material or socialization benefits relative to others.…”

“…Second, the content of leftist ideas were compatible with the grievances and experiences of colonized individuals. Ideology often “become vectors for the negotiation of dynamic, often ambiguous, intergroup status claims” (Parkinson, 2021: 54). Since the Communist Manifesto ’s publication, communism and socialism had become the dominant anti-systemic framework for oppressed and marginalized peoples overthrowing capitalist and imperialist oppressors (see, for example, Lenin, 1920).…”

“… 9. Because I use textual evidence, I make no claims about individuals’ true beliefs and I recognize that individuals may “adopt ideas simply because they are associated with identities or organizational roles they feel genuinely committed to” (Leader Maynard, 2019: 640) or because of differentiation and socialization practices (Parkinson, 2021). …”

Ethnographic Approaches to Contentious Politics: The What, How, and Why

“…What are racist activists like (Blee, 2003)? What work does ideology do in militant groups (Parkinson, 2021)?…”

Commitment to the “National” in Post-Conflict Countries: Public and Private Security Provision in Lebanon

“…We acknowledge that the concept of a “group” does not inevitably follow from ethnic or ethnosectarian identity as a category of practice (Brubaker 2002). Indeed, this assumption often problematically imposes and reifies divisions in the Middle East and elsewhere that actually belie much complexity (Parkinson 2021). Thus, our analysis deliberately focuses on variation in the organizational structures associated with different, previously institutionalized ethnic groups, and also examines intra-group differences.…”