2013 43rd Annual IEEE/IFIP Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks Workshop (DSN-W) 2013
DOI: 10.1109/dsnw.2013.6615515
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Practical Experiences with real-world systems: Security in the world of reliable and safe systems

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Cited by 6 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…As it depends on the expert knowledge the reusability in repeated analysis is not applicable since the level of experiences might be different in different teams, potentially affecting results [4]. The approach presented by Silva et al (2013) [12] is also aligned with a standard from the railway domain, and in general depends on the expert knowledge. Given this the authors have not been completely convinced that the approach would be suitable for other domains without tailoring it to the specific needs.…”
Section: B Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…As it depends on the expert knowledge the reusability in repeated analysis is not applicable since the level of experiences might be different in different teams, potentially affecting results [4]. The approach presented by Silva et al (2013) [12] is also aligned with a standard from the railway domain, and in general depends on the expert knowledge. Given this the authors have not been completely convinced that the approach would be suitable for other domains without tailoring it to the specific needs.…”
Section: B Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The analysis proposed by [18] is based on FMEA that considers only single causes of an effect, which excludes multi-stage attacks consideration. The method presented by Popov (2015) [28] may require a more complex [24], [32], [40], [45], [46] [11], [33] Unified [6], [13], [15], [17], [23], [25], [34], [36], [39], [41], [42], [43], [35], [49] [10], [12], [18], [21], [26], [28], [29], [31], [37], [38], [44], [47] failure model to address failure dependencies and trade-offs between safety and security. The approach proposed by Wei et al (2015) [31] has a limitation in terms of failures connections.…”
Section: B Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Hence, a reasonable compromise is to opt for a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches for safety-security co-engineering. • The number of methods whose goal is to ensure both safety and security (32) is slightly larger than the number of those aiming to ensure safety (30), whilst only six methods have as their primary goal to ensure security. The appropriateness of each of these approaches depends largely on the system's safety/security criticality.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…During the design of interoperable medical devices, simultaneously considering security and safety is vitally important. Safety and security and their integrated modeling have been studied in various domains, such as industrial control, 22 railroad signaling systems, [23][24][25] and avionics. 26 The lessons learned in these domains can be applied when designing safety and security for interoperable medical Safe and secure interoperability needs to be considered early on in the development of medical devices.…”
Section: Dial 'M' For Modelingmentioning
confidence: 99%