Powers and the hard problem of consciousness: conceivability, possibility and powers

Abstract

Do conceivability arguments work against physicalism if properties are causal powers? By considering three different ways of understanding causal powers and the modality associated with them, I will argue that most, if not all, physicalist powers theorists should not be concerned about the conceivability argument because its conclusion that physicalism is false does not hold in their favoured ontology. I also defend specific powers theories against some recent objections to this strategy, arguing that the conception of properties as powerful blocks conceivability arguments unless a rather implausible form of emergence is true.

The necessity of conceivability

“…First, in naturalistic accounts of powers and modality which subscribe to actualism, the argument fails at premise (2), such that conceivability does not imply even 1-possibility, because the range of possible worlds which naturalistic actualism permits is not broad enough for there to be a world which verifies P & ¬Q; P & ¬Q is not 1-possible. Allen (2020) extends these results to show that the conceivability argument fails at premise (2) or (3) in both Platonist accounts of powers and those which accept alien 17 Because of the explicit mention of Russellian Monism in the conceivability argument it is not accurate to say that the argument does not apply to it. However, it is treated as an exception to other physicalist views in that the argument does not show it to be false.…”

“…In this case, given that the properties which determine Alicia's conceiving S do so necessarily, we know that Bella's situation is not 2-possible, but that situation's being conceivable does (according to Chalmers) imply its 1-possibility. There is a world v which verifies Bella instantiating the same 18 In keeping with our presumption for the sake of the argument, we will ignore Allen's (2020) We conclude, therefore, that regarding all causal properties or processes as acting necessarily does not help to sustain the conceivability argument.…”

“…On the question of the implications of powers theories on the conceivability argument, seeAllen 2020, Aranyosi 2010, Carruth 2016; moreover, Chalmers himself considers that strong necessities, or necessary laws of nature, would undermine the conceivability were they to be plausible(2010,. CompareCumpa's (2018, 170-171) discussion of the implications of necessary and contingent causal roles of properties on Chalmers's view of the strong emergence of consciousness.16 As Allen 2020 notes, the way in which the conceivability argument would be blocked depends upon one's other commitments, including whether or not one is committed to actualism and whether one accepts an ontology of pure causal powers or powerful qualities.…”