Powerful authorities and trusting citizens: The Slippery Slope Framework and tax compliance in Italy

Kastlunger, Barbara; Lozza, Edoardo; Kirchler, Erich; Schabmann, Alfred

doi:10.1016/j.joep.2012.11.007

Cited by 186 publications

(242 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Prior research has consistently found a positive relationship between coercive power and enforced tax compliance, but no relationship between coercive power and voluntary compliance (Gangl et al, 2015;Hofmann et al, 2014;Kastlunger et al, 2013). In line with this prior work, we argue:…”

Section: Hypothesis 1 Procedural Justice Is Related To Voluntary Taxsupporting

confidence: 84%

“…Second, there may be a role division between power holders and subordinates that is accepted by both parties. In the second scenario, people perceive the authority's power as legitimate, and hence that power is grounded in a shared reality (Kastlunger, Lozza, Kirchler, & Schabmann, 2013;Muehlbacher et al, 2011). The distinction between legitimate and coercive power is arguably relevant for our understanding of tax compliance and, more specifically, our understanding of how power interacts with the procedural justice of the tax authority to shape taxpayers' voluntary compliance.…”

Section: Legitimate and Coercive Power Procedural Justice And Tax Cmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Coercive power, on the other hand, is the power on the part of tax authorities that compels taxpayers to pay taxes not out of the belief that taxes help to finance common public goods, but out of fear of tax audits and consequent punishments (Feld & Frey, 2002Kastlunger et al, 2013;Kirchler et al, 2008). In other words, coercive power is power that directs individuals against their will (Kirchler et al, 2008: 213).…”

Section: Hypothesis 1 Procedural Justice Is Related To Voluntary Taxmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Power, justice, and trust: A moderated mediation analysis of tax compliance among Ethiopian business owners

Gobena

Dijke

2016

Journal of Economic Psychology

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We explored the moderating roles of legitimate and coercive power held by the tax authority in the relationship between procedural justice, trust in the tax authority, and voluntary tax compliance. Drawing from fairness heuristic theory and the slippery slope framework of tax compliance, we predicted that procedural justice fosters voluntary tax compliance, particularly when legitimate power of the tax authority is low and when coercive power of the authority is high. Moreover, we predicted that these interactive effects are mediated by (cognition-based) trust. Finally, we predicted that coercive power of the tax authority is positively related with enforced tax compliance. The results of a field study among Ethiopian business owners supported most predictions. This research is among the first to integrate social-psychological and deterrence-related factors to understand tax compliance behavior in a developing country.

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Section: Hypothesis 1 Procedural Justice Is Related To Voluntary Taxsupporting

confidence: 84%

Section: Legitimate and Coercive Power Procedural Justice And Tax Cmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Hypothesis 1 Procedural Justice Is Related To Voluntary Taxmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Power, justice, and trust: A moderated mediation analysis of tax compliance among Ethiopian business owners

Gobena

Dijke

2016

Journal of Economic Psychology

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“…Sumber: Hasil wawancara (diolah kembali) nya kepercayaan WP terhadap "kuasa" dan adanya ketegasan "kuasa" dalam menindak "oknum kuasa" (Boone, Khurana, & Raman, 2013;Kastlunger, Lozza, Kirchler, & Schabmann, 2013;Kirchler, Hoelzl, & Wahl, 2008;Kogler et al, 2013;Prinz, Muehlbacher, & Kirchler, 2014). Sungguh sangat dihindari suatu pemahaman baru dari WP terkait adanya tindakan tercela dari "oknum kuasa" yang menodai amnesti pajak.…”

Section: Tabel 3 Membalik Realitas Kuasaunclassified

Yadnya sebagai Pemaknaan Lain atas Nilai Wajar Harta Amnesti Pajak

Darmayasa¹

2017

jamal

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“…Our conjecture that individuals who are rewarded reveal higher tax compliance rates than subjects who are not rewarded can, for example, be explained by the "slippery slope" framework initiated by Kirchler et al (2008) and further analyzed by, among others, Wahl et al (2010), Kastlunger et al (2013), and Kogler et al (2013). This concept implies that both the power of the tax authority and the trust of taxpayers in the tax authority are positively related to the tax compliance rate.…”

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confidence: 86%

The effects of rewards on tax compliance decisions

Fochmann

Kroll²

2016

Journal of Economic Psychology

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe analyze how the redistribution of tax revenues influences tax compliance behavior by applying different reward mechanisms. In our experiment, subjects have to make two decisions. In the first stage, subjects decide on the contribution to a public good. In the second stage, subjects declare their income from the first stage for taxation. Our main results are threefold: First, from an aggregated perspective, rewards have a negative overall effect on tax compliance. Second, we observe that rewards affect the decision of taxpayers asymmetrically. In particular, rewards have either no effect (for those who are rewarded) or a negative effect (for those who are not rewarded) on tax compliance. Thus, if a high compliance rate of taxpayers is preferred, rewards should not be used by the tax authority. Third, we find an inverse u-shaped relationship between public good contribution and tax compliance. In particular, up to a certain level, tax compliance increases with subjects' own contributions to the public good. Above this level, however, tax compliance decreases with the public good contribution.

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Powerful authorities and trusting citizens: The Slippery Slope Framework and tax compliance in Italy

Cited by 186 publications

References 27 publications

Power, justice, and trust: A moderated mediation analysis of tax compliance among Ethiopian business owners

Power, justice, and trust: A moderated mediation analysis of tax compliance among Ethiopian business owners

Yadnya sebagai Pemaknaan Lain atas Nilai Wajar Harta Amnesti Pajak

The effects of rewards on tax compliance decisions

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