Power Sharing, Protection, and Peace

Gates, Scott; Graham, Benjamin; Lupu, Yonatan; Strand, Håvard; Strøm, Kaare

doi:10.1086/684366

Cited by 62 publications

(46 citation statements)

References 51 publications

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“…Finally, the empirical findings of this study speak to the policy discussion of power-sharing as a common tool of conflict resolution. In line with more recent studies (Cederman et al 2015;Gates et al 2016;Graham, Miller, and Strøm 2017;Hartzell and Hoddie 2015), I find that power-sharing is not the sine qua non of successfully promoting post-war peace. Different types of power-sharing and how they are combined with each other can have very different effects on political violence.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 85%

“…Finally, this study contributes to the ongoing discussion among policy-makers on whether power-sharing is a 'best practice' for conflict management and resolution. My empirical findings contribute to recent debates over the advantages and shortcomings of particular types of powersharing (Cederman et al 2015;Gates et al 2016;Graham, Miller, and Strøm 2017;Hartzell and Hoddie 2015). So far, these discussions have not considered the likelihood that even one particular type of power-sharing on its own can have widely diverging effects on different political actors across a post-war country.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 86%

“…As I show in the following discussion, power-sharing in such dimensions frequently follow a similar logic and thus not necessarily warrant a separate analysis. For a similar argument, seeGates et al (2016).…”

mentioning

confidence: 83%

“…So far, scholars have largely understood power-sharing as a 'security commitment device' which mitigates the security dilemma between former conflict actors by providing guaranteed participation in the political decision-making process (e.g. Cederman et al 2015;Gates et al 2016;Hartzell and Hoddie 2007;Walter 2002). My approach conceptualizes power-sharing as also regulating elite access to state resources which, in turn, affects counterinsurgency strategies and the likelihood of post-war violence (Grossman 1995;North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009;North et al 2013).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Compromised Peace? The Effect of Power-Sharing Arrangements on Post-War Violence

Ottmann¹

2018

Preprint

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How does power-sharing between government and rebels affect the use of violence by political actors outside of peace agreements? To address this puzzle, I propose a political economy model of power-sharing and post-war violence. Power-sharing regulates elites' access to state resources and thus determines whether government and rebels can successfully suppress post-war rebellions. Personalized power-sharing gives elites privileged access to state resources, facilitates effective counter-insurgency strategies, and thus decreases post-war violence. In contrast, structural power-sharing limits elites' access to resources and their ability to prevent armed challenges resulting in higher levels of post-war violence. I test these propositions with a quantitative analysis of peace agreements in Africa and Asia signed between 1990 and 2006. The statistical findings lend support to my theoretical reasoning.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 85%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 86%

mentioning

confidence: 83%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Compromised Peace? The Effect of Power-Sharing Arrangements on Post-War Violence

Ottmann¹

2018

Preprint

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“…Having a rebel organization in power that has fought on behalf on a citizens' ethnic group signals to this ethnic groups' members that they are now better protected than before. Co-ethnics now exert political control within the state that might have repressed memebers of an ethnic group, creating the opportunity to veto violent actions directed against that group (Gates et al 2016;Padró i Miquel 2007).…”

Section: Ethnic Favoritism After Civil Warmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Peace Trickle Down? Micro-Level Evidence from Africa

Haaß¹,

Ottmann²

2017

Preprint

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Do peace agreements generate socio-economic peace dividends for citizens in post-war countries? While much research has focused on the elite level implications of peace agreements for the survival of peace, little is known about the micro-level, redistributive effects of peace agreements. We investigate the impact of peace agreement provisions and their implementation-specifically power-sharing arrangements-on individually reported measures of well-being. Building on a political economy theory of post-war politics, we conceptualize rebel organizations as political organizations that engage in distributive politics after conflict. As a result of such politically motivated redistribution, we expect an uneven manifestation of peace dividends on the micro-level that accumulates over the long-term.Specifically, we hypothesize that individuals with ethnic ties to rebel organizations that secure political power through a peace agreement perceive their well-being better than individuals without these links. To test this argument, we link data from recent Afrobarometer surveys to information on individuals' ethnic ties to rebel organizations in power-sharing arrangements in four African post-war countries.Controlling for a battery of factors that might simultaneously predict an ethnic group's propensity to gain political power and their members' well-being, results from a wide range of fixed effects specifications indicate support for our hypothesis.

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Party Politics

Sule,

Sambo

2024

Palgrave Studies in Presidential Politics

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Power Sharing, Protection, and Peace

Cited by 62 publications

References 51 publications

A Compromised Peace? The Effect of Power-Sharing Arrangements on Post-War Violence

A Compromised Peace? The Effect of Power-Sharing Arrangements on Post-War Violence

Does Peace Trickle Down? Micro-Level Evidence from Africa

Party Politics

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