Power-sharing, conflict resolution, and the logic of pre-emptive defection

Abstract

Conclusions about the potential for peace via power-sharing are mixed. For some, power-sharing does little to overcome the commitment problem characterizing a transition from conflict, while others argue that such concessions provide signals of parties’ willingness to incur costs. This article develops and tests a new theory, aiming to shed light on the mechanisms through which power-sharing bargains help to overcome the commitment problem. I argue that government parties tend to hold an electoral and military advantage, which heightens incentives for rebel leaders to defect from a settlement prior to conceding their capacity to use violence. Where settlements provide discrete guarantees that offset the risks of electoral defeat and the co-optation of forces, these incentives for pre-emptive defection should be mitigated. I offer a novel disaggregation of provisional power-sharing subtypes, distinguishing between long-term and short-term arrangements. The analysis rests on an original, cross-national dataset of government-and-rebel dyads to negotiated settlements signed between 1975 and 2015 (N = 168). The logistic regression results clearly indicate that power-sharing settlements stipulating ‘consociational’-style reforms are significantly more likely to resolve conflict between settlement dyads, all else equal. Meanwhile, standard conceptualizations of power-sharing, which include transitional coalitions and troop integration, appear unlikely to secure rebel commitment beyond the transition period, which helps to explain the contradictory findings in existing research.

Causal Pathways of Rebel Defection from Negotiated Settlements: A Theory of Strategic Alliances

“…In identifying the universe of settlements, I consulted a wide range of appropriate sources, especially UN Peacemaker, the U.S. Institute of Peace, the University of Ulster's Transitional Justice database, and the Conciliation Resources ACCORD collection. 18 As the analytical focus of this study is to illuminate the processes through which parties defect after having committed to peace, a negotiated settlement must result from direct negotiations between at least two belligerent parties involved in an intra-state conflict, and represent a mutually accepted and final solution in order to qualify (Johnson 2020). While the substantive provisions may vary considerably, these basic criteria require, at minimum, that the formally recognized leadership of a rebel party commits to demobilization, therefore excluding temporary ceasefires-which are especially prone to breakdown (Toft 2010)-and cases in which opposing factions are successful in spoiling a settlement prior to its signing.…”

‘Peace is not just the suspension of war:’ peace communication on Twitter

“…In Nigeria, power-sharing eases interreligious conflict (Bunte & Vinson, 2016). Looking at power-sharing settlements and conflict termination Chelsea Johnson (2020) shows that, 'when both inclusive and diffusive subtypes are included in a settlement, the likelihood of dyadic conflict termination increases to 92.31%.' On the international level, the power of international organizations is problematic.…”

Military integration and intelligence capacity: informational effects of incorporating former rebels

“…Cross-national quantitative studies have examined factors affecting military integration's inclusion in peace agreements (Hartzell 2014;Hartzell and Hoddie 2007, ch.2); impacts of integration on the likelihood of peace agreement signing and/or implementation to end a civil war (Glassmyer and Sambanis 2008;Hartzell and Hoddie 2007, ch.3;Joshi and Quinn 2017); and whether partially or fully implemented agreements produce sustained peace or conflict recurrence (Berg 2020;Derouen, Lea, and Wallensteen 2009;Hartzell and Hoddie 2007, ch.4;Hoddie and Hartzell 2003;Jarstad and Nilsson 2008;Joshi and Quinn 2017;Mattes and Savun 2009;Ottmann and Vüllers 2015;Quinn, Joshi, and Melander 2019;Toft 2009). Military integration is suggested to be especially helpful as a strategy in civil wars in which a government is facing multiple rebel groups, since ending conflict in one dyad can allow a government to concentrate on combatting remaining rebels (Brandt 2020;Quinn, Joshi, and Melander 2019), now with increased forces, 3 though the peace process itself may lead the integrated group to splinter, with some members joining the state security forces and others returning to the field as insurgents in a fragment of the original group or by joining with other rebel organizations (Johnson 2020(Johnson , 2021Quinn, Joshi, and Melander 2019;Reiter 2016;Stedman 1997).…”