Power, Satisfaction and Popularity

Abstract

Each of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council has the power to veto any proposed resolution, and thus to override the wishes of a majority of the other Council members who support this resolution. Whenever a permanent member casts a veto, it succeeds in its aim to block an unwanted resolution by unilateral action. Satisfaction in achieving this outcome, however, is purchased at a price of unpopularity because, by definition, vetoes frustrate the majority preference. In this article, Poisson probabilities are applied to study the incidence of vetoes cast by the ‘big five’ and, by implication, these states’ relative level of satisfaction and popularity over the past 55 years. The rising resort to this form of assertive unilateralism by the US in recent years presents a serious challenge to the norms of multi-lateral diplomacy in a world dominated by a single superpower.