Power indices and the veil of ignorance

Laruelle, Annick; Valenciano, Federico

doi:10.1007/s001820200121

Cited by 7 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 15 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…57-58). Laruelle & Valenciano (2003) provide further insights on the ordinary risk neutrality involved here. The reader may notice that the result in proposition 4 derives from the idea that any payoff vector can be obtained as a linear combination of games whose solutions are equal divisions amongst participants.…”

Section: Appendixmentioning

confidence: 82%

“…Roth (1988a) shows how the Shapley value can be interpreted as an expected utility function and Laruelle & Valenciano (2003) provide an axiomatic foundation of this view. Moreover, Felsenthal & Machover (1998) point out that the SS index, being derived from a solution of a cooperative game, corresponds to a notion of "voting power as expected share in fixed total prize" (p. xiii).…”

Section: Preliminaries and Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Voting chances instead of voting weights

Giannatale

Passarelli

2013

Mathematical Social Sciences

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We study political distortions that emerge in situations where agents' political power is disproportionate with respect to their economic power. We use the Shapley value to evaluate both the economic and the political power. We show that usual weighted majority voting cannot prevent political distortions from emerging in a huge mass of situations. Distortions are less severe if partners can leave the union at low cost. We propose an alternative voting method based on random assignments of voting rights. Agents are given chances to vote instead of weights. If chances are computed according to a specific formula, no political distortion occurs.As an application, we analyze the rotation voting system recently adopted by the European Central Bank. We find that this system yields an enormous amount of political distortion. Then we compute the voting chances that should be assigned to Eurozone countries in order to eliminate it.

show abstract