Power, Civil Society, and an Inchoate Politics of the Daily in Burma/Myanmar

Abstract

Burma/Myanmar's postcolonial elites have established a military-state with hybrid-imperial structures, characterized by high despotic but low infrastructural modes of power, and fueled by rent-extraction. Given the resulting evisceration of opposition political groups, citizens understand explicit politics as dangerous. That said, cleavages between state and the polity afford vast space for “civil society” groups (CS) to form and operate. CS stabilize the political economy by managing citizen needs; conversely, CS stand as a wedge between state and masses, (potentially) constructing spaces to coordinate and magnify potential demands. Yet CS currently err toward managing needs. Opposition must politicize Burmese masses and CS through idioms that interface with CS's material tasks—a “politics of the daily”—encouraging them to make, collectively, a multiplicity of non-adversarial demands. This may compel the state to pivot and seek new bargains, at which point elite advocacy-oriented CS can provide progressive policy reforms. The paper will examine recent inchoate social-political movements in Burma for models of this politics.

Civil Society and Transitional Justice in Asia and the Pacific

“…In 2008, in the wake of Cyclone Nargis, local community organisations carried out the work of rescue and repair in large parts of the country (Renshaw 2014). Turnell argues that even before transition began, civil society organisations were indispensable parts of the Burmese political economy, providing social goods and essential services that the military was incapable of delivering (Turnell 2008;Prasse-Freeman 2012). Following the 2010 election and the liberalisation of laws relating to freedom of association, the space for civil society organisations dramatically increased across the country, and since then they have played a powerful and shifting role in Myanmar's transition to democracy.…”

Myanmar’s transition without justice

“…As several scholars have pointed out, narrow definitions of 'civil society organisations' and 'community-based organisations' are not useful in the Burmese context, because they impede a full understanding of social organising and social change in the country (Kramer 2011;Prasse-Freeman 2012; see also Lidauer 2012). From 1962, under the rule of General Ne Win, three main types of civil society organisation were permitted to exist: (1) organisations affiliated with the government, whose activities were restricted largely to the promotion of literature and culture;…”

“…In 2008, in the wake of Cyclone Nargis, local community organisations carried out the work of rescue and repair in large parts of the country (Renshaw 2014). Turnell argues that even before transition began, civil society organisations were indispensable parts of the Burmese political economy, providing social goods and essential services that the military was incapable of delivering (Turnell 2008;Prasse-Freeman 2012). Following the 2010 election and the liberalisation of laws relating to freedom of association, the space for civil society organisations dramatically increased across the country, and since then they have played a powerful and shifting role in Myanmar's transition to democracy.…”

‘Building Kachin’: Youth and Everyday Action in one of Myanmar's Ethnic States

“…The process is challenged by ongoing violent conflict between the Tatmadaw and armed ethnic groups in different parts of the country, and by the encroachment of the regime on civic space (Holliday, 2014;UN, 2017UN, , 2018aUN, , 2018b. Notwithstanding these challenges, people have organized demonstrations and civil society organizations have significantly expanded the scale of their activities since 2011 (Morgan, 2015;Prasse-Freeman, 2012). Historically, youth have been key to opposition movements, both within Myanmar and from exile (Sadan, 2013: 270-90;Than, 2013;Williams, 2012.…”