Power and its Logic

Abstract

Power, Hobbes says, is a specifically human category, and one which he now couples to the condition for realizing subjective interests.To be sure, Hobbes remains faithful to the Aristotelian conception of origin inasmuch as he places the power of action at the center of his conception of power. The scope of power of a person or group of persons thus depends on the scope of their options for action to achieve their various goals. Hobbes's definition proves subsequently to be so influential for power theorists and practitioners in power politics that it finds its way into the present. An example of the aftereffect of this concept is the position of the philosopher Amy Allen, who sees power as the "ability to attain an end or a series of ends." 7 This ability, so notes Allen while concretizing the Hobbesian paradigm, does not have to be successful or force the realization of the desired purpose. An actor already has power if the execution of an action makes the intended effect likely to occur. Thus, Allen extends Hobbes concept with an explicitly probabilistic component. The power of an actor is determined not only by the extent of his or her options for action, but also by the likelihood that the corresponding acts will be successful in their implementation.The genesis of the second competing notion of power as power over, according to which power is essentially a relationship of dominance between persons, is less easy to trace. For many social theorists Niccolò Machiavelli describes this conception for the first time explicitly in his power classic, The Prince 8 . However, it is indisputable that the most well-known of the definitions of this concept in modern times was put forth by Max Weber: "Power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis upon which this probability rests." 9 It is worthwhile to dissect this compact definition into its components. First, as Weber points