Poverty and Divine Rewards: The Electoral Advantage of Islamist Political Parties

Grewal, Sharan; Jamal, Amaney; Masoud, Tarek; Nugent, Elizabeth R.

doi:10.1111/ajps.12447

Cited by 24 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Islamist parties may be able to signal to their potential supporters a dedication to good policy‐making simply by making appeals to Islam; in other words, Islam can serve as a proxy for an established party platform, especially under conditions of economic hardship (Pepinsky et al, 2012). Additionally, it may be that economic hardships push supporters of Islamist parties to hope for a more egalitarian afterlife that may be more accessible if they support Islamist parties (Grewal et al, 2019). Whether through their reputations of anticorruption or through the genuine faith of their supporters, Islamist parties seem to benefit electorally form economic downturns (Masoud, 2014; Tessler, 1997).…”

Section: “One Person One Vote One Time” and The Development Of A Pess...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Reevaluating Islamist electoral success and participation in government

Curtis

2022

Digest Mid East Studies

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Under what conditions will Islamist parties perform well in elections and what happens to the political regime should they gain political power? The canonical hypothesis—“one man, one vote, one time”—argues that Islamist parties are likely to perform well whenever elections become free and that their electoral success is likely to lead to a democratic backslide. Others argue that Islamists are not as popular as this hypothesis suggests or that only moderate Islamist parties are likely to perform well and these parties are unlikely to deliberalize a regime. I propose a modification to these hypotheses, and argue that participation in governments, not seat shares, should be conceptualized as electoral success. Furthermore, because they are often the most likely groups to face repression, the presence of Islamists in governments is indicative of a liberalizing process. Using electoral data from across the Muslim‐majority world, I find that Islamists are more likely to hold cabinet‐level positions as regimes become more competitive and that the presence of Islamists in government has a positive effect on future levels of democracy, broadly defined. These findings suggest a need to reevaluate more critical perspectives on the effect of Islamist participation in democratizing countries in the Muslim‐majority world.

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Section: “One Person One Vote One Time” and The Development Of A Pess...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Reevaluating Islamist electoral success and participation in government

Curtis

2022

Digest Mid East Studies

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“…Support for Islamists is associated with individuals' religiosity and preferences for a bigger role of religion in politics (e.g. Ciftci, 2013, Grewal et al, 2019. Islamists could exploit Ramadan's season to their advantage by the virtue of their ideology and access to Ramadan's congregations and religious channels of distribution.…”

Section: Distribution and Religious Mobilizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Religious Cycles of Government Responsiveness: Why Governments Distribute in Ramadan

Mohamed

2021

Preprint

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In many Muslim societies, autocrats expand their distributive policies in the religious season of Ramadan. Why do autocrats distribute in Ramadan? And, who do they target? Focusing on Egypt (2014-2020), this paper argues that the regime distributes in Ramadan to contain political threats to its survival by co-opting areas where such threats are more credible. I test this argument using an original municipality-level dataset of government-reported provision of economic benefits. The findings show that the government reports more economic distribution in places where political threats are higher: more socioeconomically developed, more contentious, and more affected by unpopular austerity measures. Using survey data, I also find that distribution in Ramadan translates into reputational gains for the regime, particularly among its critics. The conclusions suggest that autocrats might adopt multiple targeting strategies to respond to different threats to their survival, sometimes rewarding threatening groups to buy their acquiescence.

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“…Indeed, a clean "separation of church and state" no longer describes the politics of the vast majority of democratic countries (Fox, 2008). This is especially marked in the Middle East, where Islamist parties enjoy electoral advantages (Cammett and Maclean, 2014;Grewal et al, 2019).…”

Section: Theory Of Religious Influence On Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Prominent examples of religious party success include the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the AKP in Turkey, and the Ennadhda Party in Tunisia (Grewal et al, 2019). Many observers believe that electoral gains by religious groups have had tumultuous consequences, with citizens increasingly divided over the role of religion in politics and society.…”

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confidence: 99%

Vote with your rabbi: The electoral effects of religious institutions in Israel

Freedman

2020

Electoral Studies

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How do religious parties mobilize local support and what impact does different political strategies have on neighborhoods? Previous literature focuses on the social welfare benefits distributed by religious parties. In this paper, I analyze how religious political parties in Israel generate grassroots support among voters by allying with Jewish religious institutions. Using original data, I examine the association between the timing of entry of religious institutions into neighborhoods and local voting patterns for Israeli national elections. I find that religious institutions are associated with a 4-percentage point increase in the local vote share for religious parties, where this effect is larger for religious institutions with connections to political parties. My results suggest that the primary mechanism driving these results are that these institutions influence the vote choice of existing residents by distributing tangible goods. In contrast, changes to the composition of the neighborhood through in-migration has a more limited effect on voting patterns. These findings highlight the impact of religious institutions on the social and political fabric of local communities.

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Poverty and Divine Rewards: The Electoral Advantage of Islamist Political Parties

Cited by 24 publications

References 33 publications

Reevaluating Islamist electoral success and participation in government

Reevaluating Islamist electoral success and participation in government

Religious Cycles of Government Responsiveness: Why Governments Distribute in Ramadan

Vote with your rabbi: The electoral effects of religious institutions in Israel

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