Potential Infectious Hazards of Laboratory Techniques Ii

Reitman, Morton; Moss, Marcus L.; Harstad, J. Bruce; Alg, Robert L.; Gross, Noel H.

doi:10.1128/jb.68.5.545-548.1954

Cited by 19 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 4 publications

(2 reference statements)

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“…The number of particles aerosolized upon opening lyophilized cultures depended upon the consistency of the end product. Fluffier end products tend to create more concentrated aerosols (15). Table 1 shows that inclusion of mother liquor in the suspending menstruum reduces the aerosol concentration approximately fourfold.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Particle Size Distribution of Serratia marcescens Aerosols Created During Common Laboratory Procedures and Simulated Laboratory Accidents

Kenny

Sabel

1968

Applied Microbiology

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Andersen air samplers were used to determine the particle size distribution of Serratia marcescens aerosols created during several common laboratory procedures and simulated laboratory accidents. Over 1,600 viable particles per cubic foot of air sampled were aerosolized during blending operations. More than 98% of these particles were less than 5 ,u in size. In contrast, 80% of the viable particles aerosolized by handling lyophilized cultures were larger than 5 ,u. Harvesting infected eggs, sonic treatment, centrifugation, mixing cultures, and dropping infectious material produced aerosols composed primarily of particles in the 1.0to 7.5-,u size range. Considerable information has been compiled in recent years concerning the aerosol spread of microorganisms during routine bacteriological and virological procedures. Operations involving withdrawal of material from vaccine bottles (2, 6, 12), inoculation of mice and the inoculation and harvesting of eggs (6, 12), handling of lyophilized cultures (14, 15, 18), pipetting (2, 10, 16), use of the inoculating loop (2, 11), blending (2,

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Particle Size Distribution of Serratia marcescens Aerosols Created During Common Laboratory Procedures and Simulated Laboratory Accidents

Kenny

Sabel

1968

Applied Microbiology

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“…Photography (76) and air sampling (4,55,130,146,147,193) have shown that removing the lid from a Waring Blendor, removing the closure of a shaken culture, plunging a loop into a flame, and numerous other procedures may release migroorganisms into the environment. Lyo philization, animal inoculation, and egg inoculation and harvesting have also been shown to produce aerosols (143)(144)(145). It is little wonder, then, that infections have occurred in persons who were known only to have worked with the agent involved.…”

Section: Potential Hazardsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Laboratory-Associated Infections: Incidence, Fatalities, Causes, and Prevention

Pike¹

1979

Annu. Rev. Microbiol.

200

113

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“…For example, atmospheric sampling studies performed at Fort Detrick demonstrated that significant aerosolization of organisms occurred from performing routine laboratory procedures such as removing lids or stoppers (e.g., from Waring Blenders or a shaken culture), flaming inoculation needles, pipetting fluids, lyophilization, animal inoculation, egg inoculation and harvesting, and disturbing contaminated animal cage litter. 1,3,4,9,11,[14][15][16][17][22][23][24] Consequently, a number of other interventions may have resulted in decreases in exposures and infections, including the discontinuation of mouth pipetting, stricter requirements for wearing longsleeve operating gowns, use of nonbreakable plastic Petri dishes, and use of Luer-Lok syringes (to prevent exposures resulting from the separation of the syringe and needle). 4,11,23 Occupational illnesses occurring in biodefense research today are expected to be less frequent than observed in the offensive biological warfare program for several reasons.…”

Section: Figure 5 Vee Cases Diagnosed At Fort Detrick From 1943 To 1mentioning

confidence: 99%

Risk of Occupationally Acquired Illnesses from Biological Threat Agents in Unvaccinated Laboratory Workers

Rusnak

Kortepeter

Hawley

et al. 2004

Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, an

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Many vaccines for bioterrorism agents are investigational and therefore not available (outside of research protocol use) to all at-risk laboratory workers who have begun working with these agents as a result of increased interest in biodefense research. Illness surveillance data archived from the U.S. offensive biological warfare program (from 1943 to 1969) were reviewed to assess the impact of safety measures on disease prevention (including biosafety cabinets [BSCs]) before and after vaccine availability. Most laboratory-acquired infections from agents with higher infective doses (e.g., anthrax, glanders, and plague) were prevented with personal protective measures and safety training alone. Safety measures (including BSCs) without vaccination failed to sufficiently prevent illness from agents with lower infective doses in this high-risk research setting. Infections continued with tularemia (average 15/year), Venezuelan equine encephalitis (1.9/year), and Q fever (3.4/year) but decreased dramatically once vaccinations became available (average of 1, 0.6, and 0 infections per year, respectively). While laboratory-acquired infections are not expected to occur frequently in the current lower-risk biodefense research setting because of further improvements in biosafety equipment and changes in biosafety policies, the data help to define the inherent risks of working with the specific agents of bioterrorism. The data support the idea that research with these agents should be restricted to laboratories with experience in handling highly hazardous agents and where appropriate safety training and precautions can be implemented.

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Potential Infectious Hazards of Laboratory Techniques Ii

Cited by 19 publications

References 4 publications

Particle Size Distribution of Serratia marcescens Aerosols Created During Common Laboratory Procedures and Simulated Laboratory Accidents

Particle Size Distribution of Serratia marcescens Aerosols Created During Common Laboratory Procedures and Simulated Laboratory Accidents

Laboratory-Associated Infections: Incidence, Fatalities, Causes, and Prevention

Risk of Occupationally Acquired Illnesses from Biological Threat Agents in Unvaccinated Laboratory Workers

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