Post-truth conceptual engineering

Isaac, Manuel Gustavo

doi:10.1080/0020174x.2021.1887758

Cited by 11 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…Both positions appear compatible with a recent proposal advanced by Manuel Gustavo Isaac (2021), in reaction to Podosky's move. Isaac questions the priority of the epistemic and depicts the goals of conceptual engineering projects as being extremely adaptable to contextual considerations.…”

Section: Pluralism About the Goals And Values Of Conceptual Revisionssupporting

confidence: 88%

On pluralism and conceptual engineering: introduction and overview

Belleri

2021

Inquiry

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Pluralism is relevant to conceptual engineering in many ways. First of all, we face the issue of pluralism when trying to characterise the very object(s) of conceptual engineering. Is it just concepts? Could concepts be pluralistically conceived for the purposes of conceptual engineering? Or rather, is it concepts and other representational devices as well? Second, one may wonder whether concepts have only one function in our mental life (representation) or, rather, a plurality of functions (including non-representational ones).Third, it is a contended question whether conceptual engineering projects should pursue only one set of values and goals (epistemic ones) or, rather, a variety of values and goals, including non-epistemic ones. Finally, the engineering of a concept may result in a form of "local" conceptual pluralism, which gives rise to its own ontological and semantic challenges. Having explored the various ways in which pluralism becomes important for conceptual engineers, this contribution presents and summarizes the articles published in this special issue.

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Section: Pluralism About the Goals And Values Of Conceptual Revisionssupporting

confidence: 88%

On pluralism and conceptual engineering: introduction and overview

Belleri

2021

Inquiry

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“…17 Think for instance of the zealous biologist who would want you to revise or replace your lay concept of berry, the one you use at the fruit stall, in accordance with the actual scientific taxonomy, which classifies bananas and eggplants in the berry category, but excludes strawberries, blackberries, etc. See also Isaac (2021a), McKenna (2018, Podosky (2018), Simion (2018aSimion ( , 2018b, for why epistemic standards may stand in the way of ameliorative projects about social kind concepts, both in terms of constructionist and realist ontologies. 18 As Machery (2017: 222) states: "The class of concept-underwritten inferences is distinguished in psychological terms, exactly as is the class of concept-constitutive bliefs [sic, belief-like states].…”

Section: Round One: Scope and Impactmentioning

confidence: 99%

Which Concept of Concept for Conceptual Engineering?

Isaac

2021

Erkenn

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Conceptual engineering is the method for assessing and improving our concepts. However, little has been written about how best to conceive of concepts for the purposes of conceptual engineering. In this paper, I aim to fill this foundational gap, proceeding in three main steps: First, I propose a methodological framework for evaluating the conduciveness of a given concept of concept for conceptual engineering. Then, I develop a typology that contrasts two competing concepts of concept that can be used in conceptual engineering—namely, the philosophical and psychological ones. Finally, I evaluate these two concepts of concept using the proposed methodological framework and I show that, when it comes to making conceptual engineering an actionable method, the psychological concept of concept outclasses its philosophical counterpart on all counts. This provides a baseline from which the concept of concept can be further improved for the purposes of conceptual engineering.

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“…This paper continues a debate on one point of contestation regarding the limits of conceptual engineering. Specifically, it responds to Manuel Gustavo Isaac's (2021) claim, in response to Simion (2018a) and Podosky (2018), but in particular, Podosky, that cognitive efficacy, rather than truth and knowledge, should be the normative standard by which we assess the legitimacy of a conceptual engineering projectat least for ideological concepts.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…

This paper continues a debate on the normative limits of conceptual engineering. In particular, it responds to [Isaac, Manuel Gustavo. 2021.

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mentioning

confidence: 99%