2019
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3336023
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Post-Privatization State Ownership and Bank Risk-Taking: Cross-Country Evidence

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Cited by 6 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…To further control for any heterogeneity between the banks, a common practice is to include bank fixed effects that capture all the remaining differences between the banks that are time-invariant during the study period (Duchin and Sosyura (2014)). In recent work by Boubakri et al (2020) about the post-privatization state ownership and bank risk taking, the authors control for bank fixed effects as well as (and similarly to discussed variables in sub-section 2.3) for environmental variables of competition within the banking industry, information sharing with the private/public loan registries and creditor rights.…”
Section: Variables In Analysis Of Causal Effects In Bankingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To further control for any heterogeneity between the banks, a common practice is to include bank fixed effects that capture all the remaining differences between the banks that are time-invariant during the study period (Duchin and Sosyura (2014)). In recent work by Boubakri et al (2020) about the post-privatization state ownership and bank risk taking, the authors control for bank fixed effects as well as (and similarly to discussed variables in sub-section 2.3) for environmental variables of competition within the banking industry, information sharing with the private/public loan registries and creditor rights.…”
Section: Variables In Analysis Of Causal Effects In Bankingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To further control for any heterogeneity between the banks, a common practice is to include bank fixed effects that capture all the remaining differences between the banks that are time-invariant during the study period (Duchin and Sosyura (2014)). In recent work by Boubakri et al (2020) about the post-privatization state ownership and bank risk taking, the authors control for bank fixed effects as well as (and similarly to discussed variables in sub-section 2.3) for environmental variables of competition within the banking industry, information sharing with the private/public loan registries and creditor rights.…”
Section: Variables In Analysis Of Causal Effects In Bankingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To sharpen this procedure, we first conduct propensity score matching between state-owned savings banks and credit limited to La Porta et al (2002), Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), Khwaja and Mian (2005), Carvalho (2014), Sapienza (2004), Dinç (2005), Iannotta et al (2013), Englmaier and Stowasser (2017), Koetter and Popov (2021), Bircan and Saka (2021), and Finan and Mazzocco (2021), suggesting that government-owned banks tend to pursue political rather than social goals, as they are affected by electoral cycles and systems, which induces instability and distorts the proper allocation of funds. On the other hand, there is evidence of the social role of government ownership, as state-owned banks could finance projects for which private banks are unable or unwilling to provide financing (Gerschenkron, 1962;Stiglitz, 1993;Behr et al, 2013), exhibit lower lending cyclicality than privately owned banks and promote local economic development (Bertay et al, 2015;Hakenes et al, 2015;Behr et al, 2017), and studies such as Altunbas et al (2001) and Boubakri et al (2020) find little evidence that private-owned banks are more efficient or less risk-prone than government-owned banks. Similar to this paper, Coleman and Feler (2015) and Aghabarari et al (2021) investigate the relative performance of government-owned banks and credit unions, respectively, during crisis periods.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%