Post-populism in Zambia: Michael Sata’s rise, demise and legacy

Abstract

Models explaining populism as a policy response to the interests of the urban poor struggle to understand the instability of populist mobilisations. A focus on political theatre is more helpful. This article extends the debate on populist performance, showing how populists typically do not produce rehearsed performances to passive audiences. In drawing 'the people' on stage they are forced to improvise. As a result, populist performances are rarely sustained. The article describes the Zambian Patriotic Front's (PF) theatrical insurrection in 2006 and its evolution over the next decade. The PF's populist aspect had faded by 2008 and gradually disappeared in parallel with its leader Michael Sata's ill-health and eventual death in 2014. The party was nonetheless electorally successful. The article accounts for this evolution and describes a 'post-populist' legacy featuring hyperpartisanship, violence and authoritarianism. Intolerance was justified in the populist moment as a reflection of anger at inequality; it now floats free of any programme.

‘We are not just a union, we are a family’ class, kinship and tribe in Zambia’s mining unions

“…Members of Parliament (MPs), chiefs and local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) demanded mine jobs be given to 'locals' and that the national mining tax revenues be spent in the North Western Province (Kapesa et al 2015). Historically, North West Zambians have often perceived themselves to be excluded from Zambia's ruling coalitions (Pesa 2014), while Copperbelt unionists have had on occasion combative and at other times symbiotic relationships with national governments (Fraser 2017& Larmer 2007. Intra-union politics reflected these factors: firstly, through North Western political leaders presenting the union as a foreign interloper and then as branch chairmen depicted a disjuncture between 'locals' and 'migrants' in attempts to enhance their own political status.…”

“…Zambia's first president, Kenneth Kaunda, saw urban, Copperbelt-based development as key to the national project and he was widely (wrongly) presumed to be a Bemba (Kapesa 2019). The linkages and remittances that connected Copperbelt residents to Bemba communities in North Zambia (and Nyanja/Tumbuka communities in East Zambia) encouraged Bemba and Easterners to support Kaunda's UNIP, which many North Westerners saw as neglecting the rural economy (Fraser 2017). To this day, tribal identity and regional resource claims influence electoral support.…”

“…To this day, tribal identity and regional resource claims influence electoral support. In the 2016 election, almost all seats in Southern, North Western and Western Zambia were won by the opposition United Party for National Development (UPND), while all Copperbelt, Eastern and Northern seats were won by the incumbent Patriotic Front (PF) (Fraser 2017).…”

Cities and Dominance: Urban Strategies for Political Settlement Maintenance and Change – Zambia Case Study

“…At the time of independence, the nationalist United National Independence Party (UNIP) had its strongholds in Lusaka, the Copperbelt and the city of Kabwe, along with Northern and Luapula Provinces (Larmer 2011). Following the inauguration of one-party rule in 1973, the party maintained its dominance by, among other techniques, requiring party membership in order to access market stalls or land plots in urban areas (Fraser 2017). Street protests in Lusaka during the late 1980s after the removal of maize subsidies, proved the major impetus for democratic transition.…”

The political struggle for ‘the people’: populist discourse in the 2019 South African elections

“…Currently, there is a limited but growing literature on populism in Africa (Cheeseman & Larmer, 2015;Fraser, 2017;Hess & Aidoo, 2015;Larmer & Fraser, 2007;Resnick, 2014). However, there is, to the best of my knowledge, no study that systematically examines African leaders' populist discourse.…”