Possible Worlds and the Objective World

Qualitative Grounds

“…Moreover, this must be a “strict” notion of even de re necessity: otherwise the strict sense of Qualitative Supervenience—which says de re facts are necessitated by qualitative facts—would not even be intelligible. To defend Qualitative Supervenience, then, requires parting ways with other “Anti‐Haecceitists” who invoke a similar background picture—including the de re modal skeptic (such as Quine ; see Fine for discussion), or the Lewisian “cheap haecceitist” (at least as presented by Russell ). The key question—a question which does not arise for these other views—is how “strict” modalities are supposed to interact with the non‐qualitative.…”

“…It amounts to a kind of anti‐realism about the individualistic: individuals are not just excluded from fundamental reality; rather, there are no determinate facts about them at all. (For further discussion of this view, see Russell ; MS.) Is this conclusion absurd? Is it at odds with qualitativism?…”

“…To evalute what is necessary at a world‐frame pair, we consider what is constant when the world is shifted and the frame of reference is held fixed (cf. Einheuser ; Russell , 404).…”

“…So Dasgupta writes: “Of course it follows from my assumption that the grounded is necessitated by its grounds that qualitativism implies anti‐haecceitism (in at least one of its characterizations).” (2014, 7)The term “Anti‐Haecceitism” has unfortunately taken on several different meanings, referring to various doctrines about modality or possible worlds. For discussion see Skow (); Russell (); and Section of this paper. The meaning here is a modal doctrine, the one Russell () calls “Possibility Anti‐Haecceitism”.…”

“…For discussion see Skow (); Russell (); and Section of this paper. The meaning here is a modal doctrine, the one Russell () calls “Possibility Anti‐Haecceitism”.…”