Possible disagreements and defeat

Abstract

Conciliatory views about disagreement with one's epistemic peers lead to a somewhat troubling skeptical conclusion: that often, when we know others disagree, we ought to be (perhaps much) less sure of our beliefs than we typically are. One might attempt to extend this skeptical conclusion by arguing that disagreement with merely possible epistemic agents should be epistemically significant to the same degree as disagreement with actual agents, and that, since for any belief we have, it is possible that someone should disagree in the appropriate way, we ought to be much less sure of all of our beliefs than we typically are. In this paper, I identify what I take to be the main motivation for thinking that actual disagreement is epistemically significant and argue that it does not also motivate the epistemic significance of merely possible disagreement.Keywords Disagreement Á Defeaters Á Higher-order evidence Á Epistemic peers Á Conciliatory views Sometimes equally competent epistemic agents, after careful consideration of equally good evidence, reach incompatible conclusions. There are various principles we might adopt prescribing how (if at all) each agent ought to modify her beliefs upon learning of such disagreement. A certain class of such principles (what Elga (2007) has called 'conciliatory views') lead to a somewhat troubling skeptical conclusion: that, for the most part, when we know others disagree under the right conditions, we ought to be (perhaps much) less sure of our beliefs than we typically are.In an effort to discredit conciliatory views, one might attempt to extend this skeptical conclusion by arguing that disagreement with merely possible epistemic

Moral Responsibility, Culpable Ignorance and Suppressed Disagreement

“…Another argument for why actual disagreement should not be put on an epistemic par with merely possible disagreement is that actual disagreements give us information that merely possible disagreements may not -this is the Signalling Argument (Tersman, 2013 ;Carey, 2011 ).To see how this argument works it is helpful to take a step back and note that the reason conciliationists -those who think that we are required to revise or reconsider our beliefs when we discover that an epistemic peer disagrees with our view -believe we should take disagreements seriously is due to a kind of inference to the best explanation.…”

Armchair Disagreement

“…Since possible disagreement is pervasive, many philosophical claims cannot rationally be accepted as true or false. This, one could argue, is a reductio ad absurdum of either EW or Equal Force (see, e.g., Kornblith , 34, and Carey , 376).…”

“…The obvious reply is to change the scenario in such a way that there is no disagreement in the past or the present, and that the tyrant somehow prevents the emergence of the disagreement in the future, for example by killing all those who may become (ancestors of) his peers. See Carey , 375, n. 15.…”

Counterfactual Philosophers

“…To establish this, I'd need to veer off topic and say considerably more about possible disagreements. Allow me instead to advertise some relevant work on possible disagreements: Kelly [: 181–185], Christensen [: 208–209], Kornblith [: 34–39], and Carey []. (Another essay of mine discusses possible disagreement with one's own self: see Ballantyne [].)…”