Possibilities, Intentions and Threats: Dual Use in the Life Sciences Reconsidered

Abstract

Due to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the anthrax letters of a few weeks later, the concept of dual use has spread widely in the life sciences during the past decade. This article is aimed at a clarification of the dual use concept and its scope of application for the life sciences. Such a clarification would greatly facilitate the work of policymakers seeking to ensure security while avoiding undesirable interventions of government in the conduct of science. The article starts with an overview of the main developments in life sciences in relation to dual use. This is illustrated by discussions on synthetic biology and dual use. The findings lead to a reconsideration of the dual use concept. An area in need of further attention is to what extent threats and intentions should have impact on the definition of dual use. Possible threats are analyzed against the background of the phenomenon of securitization of health care and life sciences: considering these sectors of society in security terms. Some caveats that should be taken into account in a dual use policy are described. An acceptable, adequate and applicable definition of the dual use concept could help researchers, universities, companies and policy makers. Such a definition should build upon, but go beyond, the view developed in the influential Fink-report, which concentrates on the so-called ‘experiments of concern’, e.g. experiments that enhance the virulence of pathogens (National Research Council of the National Academies 2004) It will be argued that—in addition to these more technical aspects—a definition of dual use should include the aspect of threats and intentions.

(Re‐)Designing Nature? An Overview and Outlook on the Ethical and Societal Challenges in Synthetic Biology

“…[45] Additionally, a frequently discussed issue is the problem of possible misuse of the results and products of SB. [44,[48][49][50] Notably, this aspect has been addressed in the 2016 report of the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology where genetic engineering tools were classified as a potential element of weapons of mass destruction. Insofar as such reagents, information, and new technological approaches have the potential to be used both for beneficial as well as for harmful purposes, the work involved is designated as "dual use research."…”

“…[47] The term "dual use research of concern" (DURC) has gained international customary usage as a more precise expression for this range of possible use and misuse. [44,[48][49][50] Notably, this aspect has been addressed in the 2016 report of the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology where genetic engineering tools were classified as a potential element of weapons of mass destruction. [51] Nevertheless, there still remains a structural problem: as research within emerging biotechnologies moves on so fast, it will not be possible to hold regulatory conventions such as the Biological Weapons Convention in line with the speed of development.…”

A systematic review protocol for crime trends facilitated by synthetic biology

“…However, to date, there exists no synthesis of the varied malicious opportunities enabled or generated by biotechnology, either currently occurring or forecasted. Instead, researchers in the Life Sciences tend to focus on the benefits of these technologies for successful grant applications to further their research [18,19], social scientists explore the ethical implications of the technology for society (e.g., eugenics [20][21][22]), and governmental officials highlight the exploitation potential for defence security applications [23].…”

Between Scylla and Charybdis: reconciling competing data management demands in the life sciences

“…These concerns came to be known as “dual-use concerns” [ 6 ] and have since become topics of considerable discussion—particularly within the life sciences. The securitization of dual-use discussion has been highly influential and caused the issue to be: “moved out of the sphere of normal politics into the realm of emergency politics, where it can be dealt with swiftly and without the normal (democratic) rules and regulations of policy making” ([ 7 ], p. 748). 3…”

“…Subsequent dual-use discussions have been heavily influenced by these reports, and have predominantly focused on the possible dangers posed by published research—particularly in emerging fields such as nanotechnology and synthetic biology [ 7 ]. As a result, much of the discussion has focused on whether results should be published or not.…”