2021
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.01.003
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Positive feedback in coordination games: Stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule

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Cited by 4 publications
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“…The equilibrium selection problem in coordination games lies at the heart of evolutionary game theory starting from Foster and Young (1990), Young (1993) and Kandori et al (1993). See more recent contributions by Maruta (2002), Blume (2003), Peski (2010), Sandholm (2010), Neary (2012), Staudigl (2012), Staudigl and Weidenholzer (2014), Kreindler andYoung (2013) Sandholm andStaudigl (2016), Hwang and Newton (2017), Sawa and Wu (2018a,b), Nax and Newton (2019), Bilancini and Boncinelli (2020), Hwang and Rey-Bellet (2021), Newton (2021), andRozzi (2021), among many others. We investigate if our Bayesian dynamic has any equilibrium selection property.…”
Section: Coordination Gamesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The equilibrium selection problem in coordination games lies at the heart of evolutionary game theory starting from Foster and Young (1990), Young (1993) and Kandori et al (1993). See more recent contributions by Maruta (2002), Blume (2003), Peski (2010), Sandholm (2010), Neary (2012), Staudigl (2012), Staudigl and Weidenholzer (2014), Kreindler andYoung (2013) Sandholm andStaudigl (2016), Hwang and Newton (2017), Sawa and Wu (2018a,b), Nax and Newton (2019), Bilancini and Boncinelli (2020), Hwang and Rey-Bellet (2021), Newton (2021), andRozzi (2021), among many others. We investigate if our Bayesian dynamic has any equilibrium selection property.…”
Section: Coordination Gamesmentioning
confidence: 99%