Populism meets EU Foreign policy: the de-Europeanization of Poland´s Foreign policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Abstract

This article bridges between the de-Europeanization framework and works on populism to theorize about de-Europeanization dynamics and their potential drivers. Empirically, the article explores Polish foreign policy under the PiS government for the case of EU-foreign policy cooperation toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As a highly Europeanized foreign policy issue and longstanding EU priority, the Israeli Palestinian conflict constitutes an interesting case for the emerging research agenda on foreign policy de-Europeanization. Whilst Poland's traditional support for the EU's common approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been part of its wider Europeanization experience, we argue that under PiS government Poland's foreign policy has changed in important ways, showing signs of de-Europeanization. These changes have been driven by both, ideologically informed preferences of the Law and Justice led government as well as external expectations and pressures.

Status-seeking with a negative image – The changing position of Visegrád countries in the international community between 2004 and 2020

“…Thirdly, the post-communist legacy, the effects of the emigration towards Western European countries after accession to the EU, and the social frustration of not reaching Western living standards can be mentioned as specific elements of the political context on which populist forces could build, even if they shared many of the attributes of their Western European and American counterparts (Mansbach and Ferguson, 2021: 239-241, Taggart 2004: 277). Analysing the case of Poland, Dyduch and Müller (2021) argued that populist governments try to re-nationalise (and de-Europeanize) their politics, reverting their transformation taking place after the regime change and EU accession.…”

“…In more general terms, Cadier and Szuleczki made the point that populist parties strengthen some historical narratives which practically define what choices are politically “possible” or “legitimate” for the government, thus “delimiting the realm of the possible” (Cadier and Szulecki, 2020: 995-996). Consequently, in a community like the EU where foreign and security policy is partly conducted in close consultation with each other, the rise of populist parties can undermine joint action and identity as they seek re-nationalisation, disengagement, circumvention, and resistance (Dyduch and Müller, 2021).…”

Populist Capture of Foreign Policy Institutions: The Orbán Government and the De‐Europeanization of Hungarian Foreign Policy

“…Although there is a growing scholarly interest in the relationship between populism and foreign policy (Balfour et al, 2016; Destradi et al, 2021; Dyduch and Müller, 2021; Falkner and Plattner, 2020; Varga and Buzogány, 2020), we still know little about how populists in power engage with foreign policy institutions. Whilst national Europeanization experiences have differed across EU Member States, PRR parties joining governments often inherit foreign policy systems that have been considerably Europeanized; a scenario that has also been observed in Hungary (Hettyey, 2021).…”

De-Europeanisation in European foreign policy-making: assessing an exploratory research agenda

“…But they also highlight in both cases the search for political and economic support beyond the EU, and the ways in which this might influence foreign policy positions adopted by Athens or Lisbon. The interplay of forces internal and external to the EU can also be evidenced from the article by Dyduch and Müller (2021) on Poland: in this case, the most salient one in which populists and nationalists have been in power, there is a strong emphasis on the balance of internal forces, but there are also strong hints that links between the PiS regime and Donald Trump's USA have underlined the tension between EU values and institutions and the positions adopted by the Polish government. The attempt to reconcile a 'European' and an 'Atlanticist' orientation can also be observed in the case of Estonia, as assessed by Raik and Rikmann (2021): although populist pressures can be observed, the overwhelming influence of geopolitics and thus the importance of NATO and the US on the front line with Russia must play a substantial role in the choice of institutional and political affiliations.…”