Populism and competitive authoritarianism in Turkey

Abstract

The main goal of this paper is to explain the rise of competitive authoritarianism in Erdoğan's Turkey. The recent literature has mainly focused on the taxonomical debate about the type of regime established by Erdoğan, dealing only rarely with the factors explaining the Turkish autocratization. Building on Levitsky and Loxton's framework, which underlines the catalyst role played by the election of populist leaders for the rise of competitive authoritarianism in Latin America, the analysis identifies the interactions among Erdoğan's populism and threats and opportunities provided by both domestic and international environments as the major cause explaining Turkish autocratization.

Moving Beyond European and Latin American Typologies: The Peculiarities of AKP’s Populism in Turkey

“…The AKP illustrates how populism in an already fragile democratic regime can further erode freedoms and increase polarisation, leading to authoritarianism (Castaldo 2018;Esen Indeed, this finding explains the different categorisations and inconsistencies found in the Turkey-specific literature, as described above. The second section adopts a more comprehensive, socio-cultural approach to the study of populism, as recently advocated by scholars such as Hadiz (2014Hadiz ( , 2016 and Ostiguy (2017) and moves beyond the typologies based on Europe and Latin America by looking at comparative Asian cases, namely the Indian Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Thailand's now defunct Thais Love Thais Party (Thai Rak Thai, TRT).…”

How Turkey’s democratic backsliding compromises the international dimension of democratization

“…As noted by many scholars of Turkish politics, President Erdogan managed to concentrate more power in his hands by sidelining other important AKP figures and tighten his control over the state institutions, which were increasingly deployed against the opposition, ultimately consolidating a competitive authoritarian regime in Turkey (Çalışkan, 2018; Castaldo, 2018; Esen & Gumuscu, 2016; Lancaster, 2014; Özbudun, 2015; Yazici, 2015). Still, the July 2016 coup attempt provided the Erdogan government with further justification for a wide‐ranging crackdown.…”

“…Moreover, 189 media outlets were shut down during the state of emergency and 47 journalists remain in jail as of October 2020 (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2020; Turkeypurge, 2020). Following the coup, the AKP government also targeted the opposition, arresting HDP politicians on politically motivated terrorism charges and removing dozens of elected HDP mayors from their positions and replacing them with AKP appointees (Castaldo, 2018; Human Rights Watch, 2019).…”

“…Independent observers criticized the referendum for electoral irregularities, including the allegations of ballot‐box stuffing and vote‐rigging in some polling stations as well as the controversial acceptance by the Turkish Supreme Electoral Council (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu, YSK) of ballot envelopes and ballots without official stamp during the vote count (Çalışkan, 2018, p. 25; ODIHR, 2017). As a result, the 2016 coup attempt and the April 2017 passage of a constitutional amendment that gave Erdogan sweeping new executive powers helped pave the way for a swing toward full authoritarianism in Turkey (Çalışkan, 2018; Castaldo, 2018; Esen & Gumuscu, 2017).…”

“…Despite Turkey's robust intergovernmental and economic ties to the West as a NATO member seeking EU membership, 3. competitive authoritarianism in Turkey has been further entrenched and signs of a drift toward full‐fledged authoritarianism emerged in the aftermath of the failed coup of July 2016 (Castaldo, 2018; Çalışkan, 2018; Esen & Gumuscu, 2017). Indeed, Turkey now, together with Hungary, represents the most extreme case of democratic regression over the last decade (Maerz et al., 2020, p. 8).…”