Populism and Antitrust

Abstract

Competition law is designed to promote a consumer-friendly economy, but for the law to work in practice, competition agencies - and the courts who oversee them - must enforce it effectively and impartially. Today, however, the rule of populist governments is challenging the foundations of competition law in unprecedented ways. In this comprehensive work, Maciej Bernatt analyses these challenges and describes how populist governments have influenced national and regional (EU) competition law systems. Using empirical findings from Poland and Hungary, Bernatt proposes a new theoretical framework that will allow the illiberal influence of populism on competition law systems to be better measured and understood. Populism and Antitrust will be of interest not only to antitrust and constitutional law scholars, but also to those concerned about the future of liberal democracy and free markets.

The double helix of rule of law and EU competition law: An appraisal

“…Both in Poland and in Hungary the agencies have unconditionally cleared many transactions which led to increased concentrations involving state capital in companies which were previously owned by foreign firms. 110 Furthermore, enforcement concerning abuse of dominance by state-owned enterprises may suggest that competition authorities adopted in parallel a self-restraint approach in relation to firms owned or controlled by the state. 111 To sum up, we can see that the weakening of the rule of law within its external and internal layers has consequences for competition law which may reinforce the further weakening of the rule of law.…”

#IAmPetra; Prologue: The paradoxes of the rule of law in EU context—with special emphasis on the Polish RRP and EAW sagas; In this issue

“…And now comes a tricky case addressed by several authors in this special issue, each from their own perspective, i.e., separation of powers for Petra Bárd, 166 effet utile for Ruairi O'Neill, 167 mutual trust for Patricia Popelier, Giulia Gentile and Esther van Zimmeren, 168 and functional, systemic comparative law 169 for Maciej Bernatt 170 : the non-execution of a European Arrest Warrant 'on account of systemic or generalised deficiencies concerning the judiciary of that Member State, such as to compromise the independence of that State's courts'. 171 The test the Court of Justice has devised in its LM judgment to assess whether the implementation of an EAW shall be suspended on this account appears to be so strict that its soundness has been seriously questioned.…”

Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretation of Statutes from a Comparative Perspective

“…176 This "constitutional" mandate means that questions of law arising from the interpretation of Treaty provisions such as Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union are subject to full and comprehensive judicial review. 177 In sum, the constitutional role of the judiciary is, to a certain extent, a question of interpretation. Courts themselves have a say in this respect.…”