“… Popper's philosophy of science has been discussed extensively within systematics (see, for example, Gattei, ; Rieppel, ,b; Vogt, , ; Kluge, ; Crother and Murray, and references therein) and diverse scientific disciplines (e.g., Hansson, ; Persson, ). We are aware of some of the alleged shortcomings of Popper's position that, according to some authors, render Popper's falsificationism fatally flawed (e.g., Vogt, ). Nevertheless, we are also aware that several theoretical components tightly related to Popper's philosophy of science, such as simplicity, unification and maximization of explanatory power, have been repeatedly recognized as epistemological virtues of scientific explanations (Farris, ; Koertge, ; Norton, ; Baker, ), and as such, we consider that Popper's () characterization of scientific criticism, which allowed him to criticize the inductive logic and establish his demarcation criterion, is an extremely useful tool to consider in the epistemological debate. …”