Pope Pius XII, the Holocaust, and the Cold War

Phayer, Michael

doi:10.1093/hgs/12.2.233

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…92 These so-called 'ratlines', which were used to allow top Nazis to escape to South America after the war, had their origins in a complex web of Argentine-Spanish and Vatican diplomacy during the second half of the war. 93 However, the first escape lines over the Pyrenees from France into Spain were exploited by German intelligence, especially the SD, under the leadership of Walter Schellenberg. Moving Germans from France as the Nazi occupation was collapsing soon grew into a broader programme of movement.…”

Section: Spanish Responses: Reluctance Delay and Protection Of Nazi mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moving Germans from France as the Nazi occupation was collapsing soon grew into a broader programme of movement. 94 By 1947, Stauffer and Boos were part of this network, not only aiding prominent Nazis but also hiding Germans wanted for repatriation in Spain and facilitating their movement to the western hemisphere. 95 Stauffer depended upon her Spanish contacts to make this work.…”

Section: Spanish Responses: Reluctance Delay and Protection Of Nazi mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Beyond War Crimes: Denazification, ‘Obnoxious’ Germans and US Policy in Franco's Spain after the Second World War

Messenger

2011

Contemporary European History

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This work links the western Allies’ policy of denazification in occupied Germany to efforts to repatriate German intelligence agents and Nazi Party officials – so-called ‘obnoxious’ Germans – from the neutral states of Europe after the Second World War. Once on German soil, these individuals would be subject to internment and investigation as outlined in occupation policy. Using the situation in Franco's Spain as a case study, the article argues that new ideas of neutrality following the war and a strong commitment to the concept of denazification led to the creation of the repatriation policy, especially within the United States. Repatriation was also a way to measure the extent to which Franco's Spain accepted the Allied victory and the defeat of Nazism and fascism. The US perception was that the continued presence of individual Nazis meant the continued influence of Nazism itself. Spain responded half-heartedly, at best. Despite the fact that in terms of numbers repatriated the policy was a failure, the Spanish example demonstrates that the attempted repatriation of ‘obnoxious’ Germans from neutral Europe, although overlooked, was significant not only as part of the immediate post-war settlement but also in its bearing on US ideas about Nazism, security and perceived collaboration of neutral states like Spain.

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Section: Spanish Responses: Reluctance Delay and Protection Of Nazi mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Spanish Responses: Reluctance Delay and Protection Of Nazi mentioning

confidence: 99%