Poor Nations, Rich Nations: A Theory of Governance

Abstract

This article argues that the difference between poor countries and rich countries has to do with governance rather than resources. In emphasizing the importance of public administration in explaining economic success and failure, the author examines three general theories of governance (organizational, cultural, and structural‐functional) presented in Ferrel Heady's textbook in comparative administration. Political elasticity theory is introduced as a way to reconcile and overcome the weaknesses of these theories and to explain a number of unresolved questions in the literature having to do with decentralization, corruption, democracy, culture, and globalization, using comparative case studies (the Netherlands and Ghana, Singapore and Jamaica, and Japan and Nigeria). The implications of political elasticity theory for foreign aid are suggested at the conclusion, illustrated by a comparison of Spain and Mexico. What ties these case studies together is the heretofore unnoticed and/or unexplained fact that as countries prosper, political power takes on “rubber‐band” and “balloon” characteristics.

Linking Corruption with Institutional Failure, Terrorism, and Religious Extremism

“…Public administration research currently has very little systematic work on political extremism and terrorism despite the fact that it is a discipline ideally placed to address such phenomena, particularly in the context of government corruption (Heineman and Heimann ; Rose‐Ackerman ). Chayes's findings fit nicely with research on the causes of corruption, such as low legitimacy of political and administrative processes (e.g., Bohara, Mitchell, and Mittendorff ; Krasner and Risse ; Werlin ) and lack of transparency (e.g., Bastida and Bernardino ; Bertot, Jaeger, and Grimes ; Kaufmann ).…”

The ‘New Approach’ to Public Sector Reforms in Ghana: A Case of Politics as Usual or a Genuine Attempt at Reform?

“…In spite of these reforms, the service's performance was still not the best. As cogently summarised by Werlin (: 334),

[e]fforts during the 1990s to improve the functioning of the civil service proved unsuccessful, with the management of financial resources continuing to be weak in monitoring actual expenditures, auditing, and clearly and consistently applying regulations. All of the institutions of government were affected by pervasive clientelism and personalism (thereby undermining political software) that inevitably stoked the fires of corruption.

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Civic Engagement in Public Policy Making: Fad or Reality in Ghana?

“…A contradiction with neoliberal doctrine is apparent here: On one hand, the Ghanaian state was expected to roll back and provide space for the private sector and interest groups' participation, and on the other the state was expected to be strong, resolute, and ruthless in the policy process (Williams ). The failure of the international financial institutions' policies prompted Werlin () to reflect that the problem was not the policies per se but the lack of autonomous centers of power to challenge the overwhelming influence of the state in policy making.…”