Pollock on defeasible reasons

Sturgeon, Scott

doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9891-x

Cited by 23 publications

(20 citation statements)

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“…1 Roughly, Bottom Up asserts that appreciating first order evidence 1 Titelbaum uses 'bottom-up' for the view that when some first order belief is rationally impermissible, then 'no amount of testimony, training, or…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bottom Up Justification, Asymmetric Epistemic Push, and the Fragility of Higher Order Justification

Kappel¹

2017

Episteme

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Document Version Peer reviewed versionwhile we can reject Bottom Up, we can still accept that justified higher order beliefs significantly affect the justification of first order beliefs. Third, I argue that the epistemic justification of higher order belief is fragile in the sense that it tends to dissipate when a subject is confronted with certain defeaters, including notably the sort of defeaters arising from disagreement, precisely when higher order justification depends on first order success in the ways that one may think support Bottom Up. IntroductionSuppose that my object level belief accurately reflects the strength of the evidence available to me: my evidence e warrants credence n in a proposition p, and upon Broncano-Berrocal, and Josefine Pallavicini. Thanks to an anonymous referees for Episteme for no less than two sets of detailed and helpful comments to earlier drafts.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bottom Up Justification, Asymmetric Epistemic Push, and the Fragility of Higher Order Justification

Kappel¹

2017

Episteme

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“…In a recent paper critical of Pollock's account of the way epistemic defeaters work, Scott Sturgeon (2012) argued that while overriders (aka rebutters) generate their distinctive kind of pressure on their own, underminers "generate it only in concert with higher-order commitments about the 1 For two examples of how undermining defeat plays a role in those debates, see Christensen (2010) (1) e = <Andreas says that puffins are a species of mosquitoes> p = <Puffins fly> d = <Filippo tells me that Andreas's knowledge in naturalistic matters is poor> (2) e = <I remember having left the book on the desk> 2 As it will be evident by my constant reference in cases where the belief is based on some evidence, I'm working with a notion of doxastic justification.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In a recent paper critical of Pollock's account of the way epistemic defeaters work, Scott Sturgeon (2012) argued that while overriders (aka rebutters) generate their distinctive kind of pressure on their own, underminers "generate it only in concert with higher-order commitments about the basing of lower-order belief". Some years before, Albert Casullo (2003: 45-6) observed that " [t]ypical undermining defeaters show either that the source [of justification] is defective in some way […], or that the source is operating in an environment for which it was not well adapted".…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding undermining defeat

Melis

2013

Philos Stud

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I articulate a view according to which an important difference between undermining and overriding defeaters is that the former require the subject to engage in some higher-order epistemic thinking, while the latter don't. With the help of some examples, I argue that underminers push the cognizer to reflect on the way she formed a belief by challenging the epistemic worthiness of either the source of justification or the specific justificatory process. By contrast, overriders needn't pose any such challenge. I also provide some details on how undermining defeat works in different cases. INTRODUCTIONThe notion of undermining (aka undercutting) defeat is acquiring increasing relevance in epistemology in virtue of its connection with many issues, such as the relationship between higherorder evidence and ordinary evidence, the debate on peer disagreement, and the debate between dogmatism and conservatism in the philosophy of perception.1 This paper is concerned with the understanding of the nature of undermining defeat, regardless of its bearing on any other debate.In a recent paper critical of Pollock's account of the way epistemic defeaters work, Scott Sturgeon (2012) argued that while overriders (aka rebutters) generate their distinctive kind of pressure on their own, underminers "generate it only in concert with higher-order commitments about the 1 For two examples of how undermining defeat plays a role in those debates, see Christensen (2010) (1) e = p = d = (2) e = 2 As it will be evident by my constant reference in cases where the belief is based on some evidence, I'm working with a notion of doxastic justification.3 I will appeal to justificational triads e, p, d throughout and, for ease of exposition, I will take e, p and d to be propositions. However, I don't wish to commit myself to the claim that all evidence is propositional, but only to the much weaker claim that for every piece of evidence available to a subject, there is a proposition that can be used to represent it. 4 The parenthetic remark is meant to rule out cases of epistemic overdetermination, where the subject has access to other pieces of information for or against p, besides the mentioned e and p. Let's recall the two remarks that inspire the view I wish to explore. Sturgeon claimed that while overriders generate their distinctive kind of pressure on their own, underminers "generate it only in concert with higher-order commitments about the basing of lower-order belief". If we look at example (1) again, we can see that d appeals to the commitment that the belief that puffins fly was based on Andreas's testimony-in other words: d couldn't do its defeating job, unless that commitment (or some other very similar to it) were in place. No similar commitment is appealed to in example (2): d would have been an equally effective defeater if, say, the ...

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“…Casullo 2003, Rotondo 2013, Sturgeon 2014and Melis 2014. On Pollock's characterization of the distinction, the rebutting and undercutting defeaters of the justification of S from E for P both exert their negative effect by supplying S with reasons for believing further propositions.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Sturgeon (2014) andMelis (2014) argue that undercutting and rebutting defeaters in fact exemplify two essentially different kinds of defeat. Sturgeon, in particular, contends that while rebutting defeaters produce their effect all by themselves (by providing S with reasons to believe an incompatible proposition), undercutting defeaters work in tandem with higher-order commitments pertaining to the epistemic basis of S's first-order beliefs.…”

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confidence: 99%

Defeaters in current epistemology: introduction to the special issue
Moretti
¹
,
Piazza
²

2017
Synthese
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Pollock on defeasible reasons

Cited by 23 publications

References 3 publications

Bottom Up Justification, Asymmetric Epistemic Push, and the Fragility of Higher Order Justification

Bottom Up Justification, Asymmetric Epistemic Push, and the Fragility of Higher Order Justification

Understanding undermining defeat

Defeaters in current epistemology: introduction to the special issue

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