Polity Iv, 1800-1999: Comments on Munck and Verkuilen

Marshall, Monty G.; Gurr, Ted Robert; Davenport, Christian; Jaggers, Keith

doi:10.1177/0010414002035001003

Cited by 373 publications

(432 citation statements)

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“…Data from the Polity IV project are taken as our measure of democracy (Marshall et al 2003). This index is based on expert judgment on aspects of institutionalised democracy and autocracy within a country, both measured on an additive 0 to 10 scale.…”

Section: The Explanatory Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Death Penalty: The Political Foundations of the Global Trend Towards Abolition

Neumayer

2007

Hum Rights Rev

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Section: The Explanatory Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Death Penalty: The Political Foundations of the Global Trend Towards Abolition

Neumayer

2007

Hum Rights Rev

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“…27 I control for two additional political variables. First, because variation in borrower country political institutions may also influence IMF responsiveness, I account for Regime Type based on Polity scores (Marshall et al 2012). Theoretically, regime type could influence loan approval periods if the Board systematically scrutinizes requests from non-democracies more than those from democracies.…”

Section: Control Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Need for speed: The lending responsiveness of the IMF

McDowell

2016

Rev Int Organ

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How responsive a lender is the International Monetary Fund (IMF)? In this paper, I introduce new data on IMF loan approval periods: The days that transpire between when a borrower submits a "Letter of Intent" to the Executive Board requesting a loan and when the Board approves that request. The data reveal considerable variation across requests. Why are some loan requests approved swiftly while others wait much longer for approval? I argue that the financial interests of the G-5 economies drive variation in responsiveness contingent on when a request was made. I expect that during much of the 1980s, as G-5 commercial bank exposure increases, borrowers will face longer waits for approval. In such cases, the G-5 should have been more likely to press for the use of the "concerted lending" strategy. This protected G-5 financial systems by catalyzing private financing on behalf of those countries, but it also delayed loan approval. Into the 1990s, global capital flows grew more complex and catalyzing private capital flows required a swift response. Thus, during these years I expect increased G-5 bank exposure to be associated with shorter waits for approval. In such cases, the G-5 should have been more likely to press for I would like to thank J. accelerated approval. A quick response would have the best chance of attracting back private capital and reduce the threat posed by the crisis. Statistical analyses of 275 loan requests from 1984-2012 support these expectations.

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“…9 To test this proposition, I use the Polity II measure of democracy-a subjective measure of a country's level of democracy (Marshall et al 2013). In my analyses, I use the cumulative democracy score, Polity II, which ranges from -10 (completely autocratic) to 10 (completely democratic).…”

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Can I stay a BIT longer? The effect of bilateral investment treaties on political survival

Mazumder

2015

Rev Int Organ

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Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) have proliferated throughout the international system. While ostensibly commercial in purpose, do BITs have domestic political ramifications? I argue that BITs affect a leader's tenure through their effect on the property rights environment in developing countries. BITs, by segmenting a country's property rights environment for foreign and domestic firms, reduce the incentive for foreign firms to lobby for property rights protections in the host country thus leading to a stagnating domestic property rights environment. In autocracies, a stagnating domestic property rights regime benefits domestic business elites who can continue to stymie small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The political benefits of BITs, however, decrease as a country becomes more democratic. Using a dataset of developing country leaders over the period 1965-2011, I find support for my hypothesis that BITs are associated with a decreased hazard of losing office and that the effect diminishes with higher levels of democracy. My results highlight the consequences of the legalization of global investment on the domestic political economy.

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Polity Iv, 1800-1999: Comments on Munck and Verkuilen

Cited by 373 publications

References 0 publications

Death Penalty: The Political Foundations of the Global Trend Towards Abolition

Death Penalty: The Political Foundations of the Global Trend Towards Abolition

Need for speed: The lending responsiveness of the IMF

Can I stay a BIT longer? The effect of bilateral investment treaties on political survival

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