Politischer Humor im russischen Fernsehen – Ventil oder Instrument?

Tagangaeva, Maria

doi:10.31205/ra.258.03

Cited by 2 publications

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“…As Tagangaeva notes, "Many Russian journalists criticised PPH as offering only biased and one-sided criticism of Russia's "officially declared" enemies-America, Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus-when the leaders of Russia's allies were not the subject of a single cutting joke." 23 She adds that jokes about Putin and Medvedev were limited to three particular types: jokes about Putin's promotion of Russian cars, Putin's famous displays of masculinity and athletic prowess, and the efforts to monitor the run-up to the Sochi Olympics. The program ended in 2012 when two hosts (Svetlakov and Martirocyan) signed an exclusive deal with rival network TNT that forbade them from working on Channel One.…”

Section: P O S T -S O V I E T S a T I R Ementioning

confidence: 99%

“…This fact is not surprising given that the majority of the comedians in residence have publicly stated their support for Putin. 24 That is not to say that Comedy Club and its various spinoffs, such as Stand Up, Stand Up Women, and Nasha Russia, do not lampoon aspects of Russian society. Rather they tend to speak mainly about the general absurdity of the system.…”

Section: P O S T -S O V I E T S a T I R Ementioning

confidence: 99%

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Satire in Putin's Russia: Cynical Distance as a Tool of State Power

Brassard

2022

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For a brief period following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a degree of political freedom existed in Russia that allowed political satire to appear on television. Different oligarchs purchased important television channels and used them to push the Boris Yeltsin government to approve policies favorable to their business interests by polarizing public opinion against the government. The fractious nature of Russian media in the 1990s and the battles for influence between different oligarchs created an environment in which political satire existed openly in Russian culture, which had not been permitted during the nearly seventy years of communist rule. A particularly significant example of this was NTV's program Kukly (Puppets) (1994)(1995)(1996)(1997)(1998)(1999)(2000)(2001)(2002) based on the UK program Spitting Image, which featured puppet versions of prominent Russian politicians, and aired threehundred-sixty-three episodes. Yeltsin unexpectedly resigned as president of Russia on December 31, 1999, and was succeeded by Vladimir Putin, who has remained the central political figure in Russia since then. Putin's government almost immediately began to reign in media freedoms. By the end of 2002, all of Russia's major media properties were under the control of either a state-owned company or close allies of the Russian government. Unsurprisingly Kukly was taken off the air that year, and political satire disappeared from Russian mass culture. This paper will map out the development of Russian satire on television since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Using prominent examples from unscripted standup comedy, evening variety shows and scripted dramas that are openly political and apparently apolitical, this paper argues the Russian television industry engages with and subverts the potential of various satirical genres resulting in the creation of cynical distance that potentially impedes the ability of satire to speak truth to power.

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Section: P O S T -S O V I E T S a T I R Ementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: P O S T -S O V I E T S a T I R Ementioning

confidence: 99%

Satire in Putin's Russia: Cynical Distance as a Tool of State Power

Brassard

2022

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Between Glamorous Patriotism and Reality-TV Aesthetics: Political Communication, Popular Culture, and the Invective Turn in Trump’s United States and Putin’s Russia

Kanzler

Scharlaj

2017

Zeitschrift Für Slawistik

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SummaryThis article proceeds from the observation that Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin—two politicians frequently correlated and compared since Trump’s bid for the Presidency—have been remarkably successful in mobilizing support for their politics and in seemingly immunizing their rhetorics against vernacular critique. To work toward an understanding of this phenomenon, we propose to look at how political communication by and around the two politicians draws on forms and venues of popular culture. Both contexts, we will argue, have developed new strategies for the instrumentalization of popular culture, strategies that, while actualized differently in the two settings, revolve around an ‘invective turn’ in political communication—a radicalization of the familiar nationalist rhetoric of ‘us versus them’ that seems specifically fueled by pop-cultural forms. To explore this traffic between pop and politics, this article puts into conversation two case studies: On the one hand, of Trump’s campaign speeches which, we contend, symbolically organize around the logic of agôn—of the competitive game—as it has coagulated in the reality-tv genre of the gamedoc. On the other hand, we look at (state-controlled) pop music in the Russian genre of

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Politischer Humor im russischen Fernsehen – Ventil oder Instrument?

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

Satire in Putin's Russia: Cynical Distance as a Tool of State Power

Satire in Putin's Russia: Cynical Distance as a Tool of State Power

Between Glamorous Patriotism and Reality-TV Aesthetics: Political Communication, Popular Culture, and the Invective Turn in Trump’s United States and Putin’s Russia

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