Politische Historiker und deutsche Kultur. Die Schriften und Reden von Georg v. Below, Hermann Oncken und Gerhard Ritter im Ersten Weltkrieg

Cornelißen, Christoph

doi:10.1515/9783110446531-010

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“…163 Although Ritter denied that Germany had embarked upon a war of conquest in 1914, 164 he conceded that the Great War had militarised Germany. 165 In his magnum opus, on the 'problem of militarism' in Germany, 166 Ritter was nevertheless insistent that such a societal phenomenon was hardly unique to Germany. 167 The work of Ritter and others added scholarly weight to West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's dishonest assertion that the German soldier had always 'fought honourably' in the Second World War.…”

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Carl von Clausewitz and his Philosophy of War: The Evolution of a Reputation, 1831–2021

Hughes¹

2020

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This article is concerned with the evolution of the reputation of the Prussian soldier and philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831). It examines developments in debates about the reception, and relevance, of Clausewitz's work for strategic thought in both the historical and contemporary contexts. This article takes note of many of the misperceptions and misinterpretations directed at Clausewitz's work since his death. It argues that much of the criticism directed at Clausewitz is rooted in a visceral dislike of past proponents of Clausewitz for their aggressive and militaristic policies. An appreciation of this history is nevertheless useful for facilitating accurate interpretations of Clausewitz's work. Finally, the article argues that the notion of Clausewitz as advocate of militarism and aggressive war has been largely discredited. Indeed, in today's Federal Republic of Germany, the reformers masterminding the Wars of Liberation against Napoleon, of whom Clausewitz was one, and the resistance involved in the bomb plot of 20 July 1944, have now come to represent a useable historical tradition. Clausewitz's greatest lesson for my profession was that the soldier, for all his patriotism, valor, and skill, forms just one leg in a triad. Without all three legs engaged, the military, the government, and the people, the enterprise cannot stand. General Colin L. Powell, United States Army, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1989-93 1 You will be horrified to hear that I have never read Clausewitz […]. The opinion on Clausewitz in our general staff was that of a theoretician to be read by professors. 2 Former General Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg to Basil H. Liddell Hart,

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confidence: 99%