Politics for the day after tomorrow: The logic of apocalypse in global climate politics

Abstract

The recent global climate change discourse is a prominent example of a securitization of environmental issues. While the problem is often framed in the language of existentialism, crisis or even apocalypse, climate discourses rarely result in exceptional or extraordinary measures, but rather put forth a governmental scheme of piecemeal and technocratic solutions often associated with risk management. This article argues that this seeming paradox is no accident but follows from a politics of apocalypse that combines two logics -those of security and risk -which in critical security studies are often treated as two different animals. Drawing on the hegemony theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, however, this article shows that the two are inherently connected. In the same way as the Christian pastorate could not do without apocalyptic imageries, today's micro-politics of risk depends on a series of macro-securitizations that enable and legitimize the governmental machinery. This claim is backed up by an inquiry into current global discourses of global climate change regarding mitigation, adaptation and security implications. Although these discourses are often framed through the use of apocalyptic images, they rarely result in exceptional or extraordinary measures, but rather advance a governmental scheme of risk management. Tracing the relationship between security and risk in these discourses, we use the case of climate change to highlight the relevance of our theoretical argument.

From conflict to resilience? Explaining recent changes in climate security discourse and practice

“…Since then, actors as diverse as Western policymakers, defence and intelligence actors, think tanks, and environmental and humanitarian NGOs have painted a dramatic picture of climate change as a potential threat to international and/or national security. In short, climate change is assumed to threaten security by destabilising already fragile countries and regions, by inducing larger waves of international or internal migration, and by fuelling conflicts over already-scarce resources (Bettini 2014a, Detraz and Betsill 2009, Hartmann 2010, Methmann and Rothe 2012, Rothe 2012, Boas 2015. As these examples prove, the referent objects in climate security discourse -that which is deemed to be threatenedare quite diverse and range from the whole planet or humanity to countries or even single individuals (as in human security storylines; Methmann and Rothe 2012).…”

“…In short, climate change is assumed to threaten security by destabilising already fragile countries and regions, by inducing larger waves of international or internal migration, and by fuelling conflicts over already-scarce resources (Bettini 2014a, Detraz and Betsill 2009, Hartmann 2010, Methmann and Rothe 2012, Rothe 2012, Boas 2015. As these examples prove, the referent objects in climate security discourse -that which is deemed to be threatenedare quite diverse and range from the whole planet or humanity to countries or even single individuals (as in human security storylines; Methmann and Rothe 2012). The early history of climate security discourse was marked by a rather alarmist tone (Homer-Dixon 1999, MOD DCDC 2007, and depicted a looming humanitarian crisis of climate conflicts and a mass flux of climate refugees threatening the world with chaos and menace (see Bettini 2014a).…”

“…The early history of climate security discourse was marked by a rather alarmist tone (Homer-Dixon 1999, MOD DCDC 2007, and depicted a looming humanitarian crisis of climate conflicts and a mass flux of climate refugees threatening the world with chaos and menace (see Bettini 2014a). Articulations by Western politicians or scientists generally shared an emphasis on the secondary implications of climate change -also called 'second-order threats' (Methmann and Rothe 2012) -that put the global North in danger: the spillover effects from the global South. Thus, vulnerable communities in the global South are imagined as 'the silenced "Other" … [that has] … no agency and [is] driven by desperation, easily becomes unpredictable, wild "other" that threatens "us"' (Bettini 2014a, p. 70).…”

Torn between war and peace: Critiquing the use of war to mobilize peaceful climate action

“…Interestingly, from an environmental securitization perspective we again find a difference. This time between debates that treat climate change as an externality, as when discussing 'climate shocks' (Methmann & Rothe, 2012), or those which treat climate change endogenously as resulting from human activity. The value of this difference is limited for while a clear enemy might indeed be absent in the latter case, enemies are created nonetheless.…”

“…Likewise, Yuen talks about the 'paralyzing effects of fear ' (2012, p. 16; as quoted by Chaturvedi & Doyle, 2015, p. 1). In other words, these authors argue that to call upon the threat level of WWII, one of the ultimate securitization claims together with apocalypses (Methmann & Rothe, 2012) and nuclear winters (Chaturvedi & Doyle, 2015, p. 15), could in fact hinder the very actions that need to be taken by overstating their case or by giving an impression of inevitability (cf environmental psychology like Stoknes, 2014;O'Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009). …”