"Politics as Markets" Reconsidered: Natural Monopolies, Competitive Democratic Philosophy and Primary Ballot Access in American Elections

Schleicher, David

doi:10.1086/scer.14.3655312

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Wohlgemuth (: 281) writes about entry barriers to the ‘participation in the auction’, and an almost automatic logical conclusion from this is the recognition that the market for parties is not another market's ‘anteroom’, but rather a standalone market with its own structure. Schleicher () refers to this insight explicitly when he talks about the ‘pre‐election market’ as a ‘downstream market’ compared to the election market.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Electoral reforms, entry barriers and the structure of political markets: A comparative analysis

Sebők

Horvath

Balázs

2018

European J Political Res

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This article investigates the impact of electoral reforms on entry barriers in political markets. The discussion starts by delineating the theoretical boundaries of various political markets, such as those for participation, parties and government. By taking a cue from industrial organisation theory, the article offers an analysis of entry barriers, both hard and soft, along with their operationalisation for empirical research. Based on this theoretical framework, a single hypothesis is investigated. It posits that the modification of the entry barriers in the market for parties leads to changes in the concentration of the popular vote for party lists. An observable implication of this relationship would be if an electoral reform that raises entry barriers led to subsequent increases in the Herfindahl index (a measure of market concentration), and vice versa. This proposition is empirically tested by a comparative analysis of a new database covering Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The analysis offers support for the following proposition: in most cases the changes in the entry barriers led to a corresponding change of concentration in the market for parties.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Electoral reforms, entry barriers and the structure of political markets: A comparative analysis

Sebők

Horvath

Balázs

2018

European J Political Res

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“…(Schleicher 2006, p. 177). 37 Schleicher (2006), for instance, has expanded on the "parsimonious" markets model to include a theory of the two parties as a "natural duopoly." Charles (2007) attempts to make structuralism less abstract, and hence more useful to courts, by wedding individual rights approaches to an account of how political institutions affect those rights.…”

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confidence: 99%

Democracy and Electoral Processes

Issacharoff

Miller

2010

Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law

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Die Rolle der Parteien bei der staatlichen Organisation der Wahlen: Entscheider in eigener Sache oder unabhängige Wettbewerbshüter?

Pilniok

2016

Parteien in Staat Und Gesellschaft

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"Politics as Markets" Reconsidered: Natural Monopolies, Competitive Democratic Philosophy and Primary Ballot Access in American Elections

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

Electoral reforms, entry barriers and the structure of political markets: A comparative analysis

Electoral reforms, entry barriers and the structure of political markets: A comparative analysis

Democracy and Electoral Processes

Die Rolle der Parteien bei der staatlichen Organisation der Wahlen: Entscheider in eigener Sache oder unabhängige Wettbewerbshüter?

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