2015
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2635741
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Politically Connected Boards, Value or Cost: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in China

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Cited by 8 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…The median score for the number of board meetings is 8 with companies above (below) the median coded as 1 (0) (Kent and Stewart, ; Abeysekera, ; Gray and Nowland, ; Kent and Zunker, ). Companies with a majority of independent directors are coded as 1 and alternatively 0 without a majority (Hillier and McColgan, ; Xu et al ., ; Han and Zhang, ; Hollindale et al ., ). Lastly, a dichotomous variable is used for audit committee, taking a value of 1 if companies have an audit committee in operation and 0 otherwise (Chen et al ., ; Baxter and Cotter, ; Contessotto and Moroney, ).…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The median score for the number of board meetings is 8 with companies above (below) the median coded as 1 (0) (Kent and Stewart, ; Abeysekera, ; Gray and Nowland, ; Kent and Zunker, ). Companies with a majority of independent directors are coded as 1 and alternatively 0 without a majority (Hillier and McColgan, ; Xu et al ., ; Han and Zhang, ; Hollindale et al ., ). Lastly, a dichotomous variable is used for audit committee, taking a value of 1 if companies have an audit committee in operation and 0 otherwise (Chen et al ., ; Baxter and Cotter, ; Contessotto and Moroney, ).…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Han et al . () find that stocks of firms with politically connected directors who are targeted by the regulatory change show on average a significantly positive abnormal return, and suggests that the agency cost effect of a politically connected director dominates the value effect. Faccio et al .…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Political connections are important in any country but especially so in a rapidly emerging market such as China's. Research in this area includes the pros and cons of politically connected boards (Han and Zhang, ), the effect of politically connected boards on auditor choice and accounting disclosure (Liu et al ., ), and politically connected boards and credit financing (Peng et al ., ).…”
Section: Output–expert Judgementmentioning
confidence: 99%