Political representation and ethnic conflict in new democracies

Abstract

This paper is an exploratory analysis of the efficacy of parliamentary representation as a means to moderate ethnic conflict in new democracies. We agree with many others that the interests of an ethnic minority group are better protected when the group has access to decision makers, can block harmful government policies, and can veto potentially damaging decisions. Parliamentary representation, however, does not always allow for an effective representation of those who are not in government. Seats in the legislature may be of little use in a parliament where the executive dominates the policy process at all stages. This paper focuses on the new democracies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union between 1990 and 2000. We use the number of parliamentary seats obtained by the ethnic minority group as our main independent variable and the MAR index of ethnic protest and rebellion as our dependent variables. In addition, we employ the system of government (i.e., parliamentary versus presidential) as a proxy indicator of the degree of influence that parliamentary parties have over decision-making. A cross-section-time-series regression analysis shows that the ameliorative effect of parliamentary representation over ethnic conflict is stronger in those legislatures where the ethnic group has effective influence over decision making. It is also shown that representation within national parliaments has no ameliorative effects over violent secessionist conflicts. When the ethnic minority's demands are too radical, parliamentary representation is simply an inadequate instrument.

Political parties in conflict-prone societies: regulation, engineering and democratic development

“…[and] higher levels of representation in parliament do not automatically lead to a moderation of ethnic conflict''. 63 Moreover, PR facilitates the electoral success of mono-ethnic parties. This is, indeed, a common complaint about the working of PR in Bosnia-Herzegovina,64 hailed as an electoral law embodying ''the most progressive international thinking in electoral design''.65 Claims about the aggregative incentives of list PR find only very weak empirical support.…”

“…In Macedonia, the registration requirement is very low and required only once.62 In Romania, minorities are exempt from the requirement. 63 In Hungary, the requirement is not much higher than in Macedonia. However, this requirement is associated with each election rather than a party's foundation.64 Consequently, to sustain a political party over time, the organizational capacity of the Roma in Hungary must exceed that of the Roma in Macedonia.…”

Ethnic Group Representation in a Cross-National Comparison

“…The data used are based on individual members of parliament and do not attempt to infer ethnicity from party membership. Rather than single estimates, Alonso and Ruiz (2007) and Reynolds (2006) use averages for multiple elections where applicable. As a result of the multiple data sources, there are two or even three data points for many of the countries, and in no case can apparent discrepancies between sources be determined.…”

“…These sources indicate the ethnicity of individual members of parliament, or quantify the proportion of members of parliament in a certain ethnic group. The data collected were complemented by data collected by Alonso and Ruiz (2007), Reynolds (2006), as well information included in country reports published by the US Department of State (2006). Alonso and Ruiz (2007) collected data for 16 countries in Eastern Europe; Reynolds (2006) covered a range of countries across the world, whereas the US Department of State reports cover most countries of the world.…”

“…The data collected were complemented by data collected by Alonso and Ruiz (2007), Reynolds (2006), as well information included in country reports published by the US Department of State (2006). Alonso and Ruiz (2007) collected data for 16 countries in Eastern Europe; Reynolds (2006) covered a range of countries across the world, whereas the US Department of State reports cover most countries of the world. As with the data newly collected for 2006, the number of parliamentary seats is the basis for these data.…”